Counterfactual Sensitivity and Robustness by Christensen, Timothy & Connault, Benjamin
Counterfactual Sensitivity and Robustness∗
Timothy Christensen† Benjamin Connault‡
April 14, 2019
Abstract
Researchers frequently make parametric assumptions about the distribution of unobservables
when formulating structural models. Such assumptions are typically motived by computational
convenience rather than economic theory and are often untestable. Counterfactuals can be par-
ticularly sensitive to such assumptions, threatening the credibility of structural modeling exer-
cises. To address this issue, we leverage insights from the literature on ambiguity and model
uncertainty to propose a tractable econometric framework for characterizing the sensitivity of
counterfactuals with respect to a researcher’s assumptions about the distribution of unobserv-
ables in a class of structural models. In particular, we show how to construct the smallest and
largest values of the counterfactual as the distribution of unobservables spans nonparametric
neighborhoods of the researcher’s assumed specification while other “structural” features of the
model, e.g. equilibrium conditions, are maintained. Our methods are computationally simple
to implement, with the nuisance distribution effectively profiled out via a low-dimensional con-
vex program. Our procedure delivers sharp bounds for the identified set of counterfactuals (i.e.
without parametric assumptions about the distribution of unobservables) as the neighborhoods
become large. Over small neighborhoods, we relate our procedure to a measure of local sensi-
tivity which is further characterized using an influence function representation. We provide a
suitable sampling theory for plug-in estimators and apply our procedure to models of strategic
interaction and dynamic discrete choice.
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1 Introduction
Researchers frequently make strong parametric assumptions about the distribution of unobservables
when formulating structural models, often for computational convenience.1 Yet economic theory
typically provides little or no guidance as to the correct specification of the distribution of unobserv-
ables and in many models, such as those we consider in this paper, the distribution of unobservables
is not nonparametrically identified. Ex-ante policy evaluation exercises, or counterfactuals, can be
particularly sensitive to potentially incorrect distributional assumptions. Sensitivity arises through
two channels. The distributional assumptions are first used at the estimation stage, as they help
define the mapping from structural parameters to observables. The assumptions are again used
at the evaluation stage, when solving the model under the policy intervention at the estimated
structural parameters. Counterfactual choice probabilities may be particularly sensitive to distri-
butional assumptions, as they are essentially probabilities of tail events that are not observed in
the data. The potential sensitivity of counterfactuals to such assumptions threatens the credibility
of structural modeling exercises, a point made even by proponents of structural modeling (see, e.g.,
Section 5 of Keane, Todd, and Wolpin (2011)).
In this paper, we introduce a tractable econometric framework to characterize the sensitivity of
counterfactuals with respect to distributional assumptions in a class of structural models. We show
how to construct sets of counterfactuals as the distribution of interest spans neighborhoods of the
researcher’s assumed specification while other “structural” features of the model, e.g. equilibrium
conditions, are maintained. This approach is in the spirit of global sensitivity analysis advocated
by Leamer (1985). Global, rather than local, approaches to characterizing sensitivity in structural
models are important, as the nonlinearity of structural models and/or policy interventions means
that policies can have different effects at different points in the parameter space. Global sensitivity
analyses of nonlinear models can be computationally and theoretically challenging, however.2 Local
sensitivity analyses—based on local linearization around an assumed true specification—are often
more tractable. However, local approaches may fail to correctly characterize the counterfactuals
predicted by the model when the researcher’s assumed distribution of unobservables is misspecified
by a degree that is not vanishingly small.
1The empirical trade literature typically specifies the distributions of latent idiosyncratic efficiencies or costs
as Fre´chet or Pareto for computational convenience (see, e.g., Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Allen and Arkolakis
(2014)). Workhorse dynamic discrete choice models following Rust (1987) are typically implemented assuming that
latent payoff shocks are extreme-value distributed for computational convenience. Prominent works analyzing strate-
gic interaction using models of static and dynamic discrete games make strong parametric assumptions about the
distribution of latent payoff shocks (see, e.g., Ericson and Pakes (1995), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Bajari,
Benkard, and Levin (2007), Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), and Bajari, Hong,
and Ryan (2010)). Moreover, strong parametric assumptions about the distribution of utility shocks and random co-
efficients are frequently made, partly for computational considerations, when evaluating policies using differentiated
products demand models following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).
2See, for example, work on partially identified semiparametric models by Chen, Tamer, and Torgovitsky (2011)
which is motivated partly by questions of sensitivity with respect to various modeling assumptions.
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The key innovation of our approach is to leverage insights from the robustness literature in eco-
nomics pioneered by Hansen and Sargent (see, e.g., Hansen and Sargent (2001, 2008)) to simplify
computation using convex programming techniques. To make the analysis as tractable as possi-
ble, we restrict attention to a class of structural models whose equilibrium restrictions may be
written as a set of moment in/equalities, where the expectation is taken with respect to the dis-
tribution of unobservables. This class is sufficiently broad that it accommodates many models of
static and dynamic discrete choice and some models of static or dynamic discrete games. Following
the robustness literature, we define nonparametric neighborhoods in terms of statistical divergence
from the researcher’s assumed specification, with the option to add location/scale normalizations
or smoothness constraints as appropriate. Consider the problem of minimizing or maximizing the
counterfactual at a particular value of structural parameters by varying the distribution over this
neighborhood, subject to the equilibrium conditions summarized in the moment in/equalities. This
infinite-dimensional optimization problem can be recast as convex program of fixed (low) dimension
for the class of problems we consider. Similar insights also underlie other latent variable methods
in econometrics (see, e.g., Schennach (2014)) and generalized empirical likelihood, though their
redeployment here to target counterfactuals appears novel. The low-dimensional convex programs,
when embedded in an outer optimization over structural parameters, deliver the smallest and
largest counterfactuals consistent with the model as the distribution varies over the neighborhood.
Moreover, our approach is robust to partial identification and irregular estimability of structural
parameters, both of which may be important in applications.
We propose plug-in estimators of the smallest and largest counterfactual obtained as the distribu-
tion varies over nonparametric neighborhoods of the researcher’s assumed specification and develop
a suitable sampling theory. In particular, we show that the estimators are consistent and estab-
lish their joint asymptotic distribution. Although the distribution will typically be nonstandard,
inference is still feasible via subsampling or modified bootstrap methods.
In addition, we characterize the properties of the sets of counterfactuals over very large or very
small neighborhoods of the researcher’s assumed specification. We show that our procedure delivers
sharp bounds on the identified set of counterfactuals (i.e. without any parametric assumption about
the distribution of unobservables) as the neighborhood size expands, provided the researcher’s
assumed specification satisfies a type of support condition. In this sense, our use of neighborhoods
constrained by statistical divergence can be viewed as an (infinite-dimensional) sieve: although
the neighborhoods exclude many distributions, as they become larger they eventually span the
set of distributions relevant for characterizing the identified set of counterfactuals. Unlike finite-
dimensional sieve methods, however, here the dimensionality of the optimization problem remains
fixed as we consider increasingly rich classes of distributions. Our methods therefore provide a
tractable way for characterizing identified sets of counterfactuals in nonlinear structural models
without specifying distributions of unobservables.
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Small neighborhoods are relevant for comparing our procedure with local sensitivity analyses. To
this end, we describe a measure of local sensitivity of counterfactuals with respect to the researcher’s
assumed specification and formally relate it to our procedure when the neighborhood size is small.
Our sensitivity measure is conceptually different from the local sensitivity measures proposed by
Andrews, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017, 2018), which treat the model specification as given and
quantify sensitivity of counterfactuals with respect to local misspecification of the moments used
at the estimation stage. In point-identified, sufficiently regular models typically studied in the local
sensitivity literature, we show that our sensitivity measure may be characterized by a particular
influence function representation. Using this representation, we provide a simple and consistent
plug-in estimator of local sensitivity, which researchers may easily report alongside their estimated
counterfactuals in structural modeling exercises.
We illustrate the usefulness of our procedure with application to two workhorse models, namely a
canonical entry game and an infinite-horizon model of dynamic discrete choice. The game provides
a suitable laboratory to illustrate our procedure in a transparent way, as all calculations can be
performed in closed form. The dynamic discrete choice example illustrates how our procedure can
reveal important asymmetries that may be overlooked in a local sensitivity analysis.
Related literature Our approach has some similarities with the literature on global prior sen-
sitivity in Bayesian analysis. Broadly speaking, this literature studies variation in the posterior as
the prior ranges over a class of priors. Early notable references include Chamberlain and Leamer
(1976), Leamer (1982), Berger (1984), and Berger and Berliner (1986). Of particular relevance are
recent works by Giacomini, Kitagawa, and Uhlig (2016) and Ho (2018) who consider nonparamet-
ric classes of priors that are constrained by Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence relative to a default
prior, also partly motivated by the robustness literature in economics. The contexts and objectives
of these two works are very different from ours.3 Nevertheless, they also inherit tractability in
complex, partially identified settings by specifying neighborhoods in terms of statistical divergence
from a researcher’s assumed (prior) distribution.
In principle, one could attack our problem by framing it as a subvector estimation/inference problem
in a partially identified semiparametric model. Chen et al. (2011), Tao (2014), and Chernozhukov,
Newey, and Santos (2015) study inference in general partially-identified semiparametric models
using sieve approximations for the infinite-dimensional parameter (i.e., the distribution of unob-
servables in our setting). We consider a nonparametric class constrained by statistical divergence
from a researcher’s assumed distribution, rather than a ball of “smooth” functions typically assumed
so as to justify a sieve approximation. In principle, one could adapt various inference methods from
3Both works study sensitivity with respect to priors for Bayesian inference whereas we study sensitivity with
respect to a particular modeling assumption, namely a distributional over unobservables in structural models, and
our inference methods are not Bayesian. Giacomini et al. (2016) emphasize application to structural VARs whereas
Ho (2018) emphasizes applicability to large-scale DSGE models.
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this literature to construct confidence sets for counterfactuals. This approach would require an inner
optimization over the sieve coefficients—whose number must increase to infinity in order to span
the full set of distributions—that would generally be non-convex. For the more restrictive class of
problems we consider, our approach eliminates the infinite-dimensional nuisance parameter via a
convex program of fixed (low) dimension.
The use of convex programming to eliminate distributions of latent variables has been previously
noted in the important works of Ekeland, Galichon, and Henry (2010) and Schennach (2014). Both
of these earlier works consider somewhat different classes of models from those that we consider.
These works are also concerned primarily with characterizing the identified set of structural pa-
rameters whereas we are concerned with characterizing sensitivity of counterfactuals with respect
to a researcher’s modeling assumptions, so the resulting convex programs are different. In recent
work that is concurrent with ours, Li (2018) relaxes some restrictions on the moment functions
and the support of unobservables in Ekeland et al. (2010) and suggests performing inference on
counterfactuals via subvector methods for moment inequality models. By targeting counterfactuals
directly and leveraging some additional structure, our approach sidesteps this difficult subvector
inference problem.
A number of other recent works construct identified sets of counterfactuals in specific models with-
out making parametric assumptions about the distributions of unobservables. Examples of works
that bound counterfactuals in discrete choice models include Manski (2007, 2014), Allen and Re-
hbeck (2017) and Chiong, Hsieh, and Shum (2017). Norets and Tang (2014) construct identified
sets of counterfactuals in infinite-horizon dynamic binary choice models via a reparameterization
which is specific to binary choice settings. Torgovitsky (2016) bounds counterfactuals in dynamic
potential outcomes models. Of these works, Manski (2007), Norets and Tang (2014), and Torgovit-
sky (2016) study inference. Manski (2007) proposes finite-sample confidence sets that are specific to
that class of models. Torgovitsky (2016) uses subsampling and inversion of a profiled test statistic.
Norets and Tang (2014) and perform inference using Bayesian methods.
There is also an active literature on local sensitivity. Local sensitivity analyses typically consider
deviations from a “true” limiting model that are shrinking to zero at an appropriate rate with
the sample size (i.e. contiguously). The idea is that, as one observes more data, larger departures
may be detected using various statistical tests. This approach does not therefore seem appropriate
when we are concerned with sensitivity with respect to an (untestable) assumption regarding the
distribution of unobservables. Indeed, much of the recent literature on local sensitivity is concerned
with formulating estimators and inference procedures that are robust to local misspecification
of moment conditions and the like, which is a different problem from that which we consider.
Nevertheless, Kitamura, Otsu, and Evdokimov (2013) and Bonhomme and Weidner (2018) are
notable for their use of local neighborhoods characterized by statistical divergence. Both of these
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papers are concerned with formulating estimators that are optimal under local misspecification.
Like us, Bonhomme and Weidner (2018) target a specific aspect of model specification. Andrews
et al. (2017, 2018) proposed reporting measures to characterize the sensitivity of estimators of
counterfactuals or structural parameters with respect to moments used in estimation. In their
framework, the distribution of observables is modeled as possibly (locally) misspecified. Armstrong
and Kolesa´r (2018) discuss optimal inference in this context and Mukhin (2018) draws connections
with semiparametric efficiency theory. Although we assume the model is correctly specified (i.e.,
there exists a distribution of unobservables and parameter vector that can rationalize the model),
it would be interesting to extend our methods along the lines of these works to allow for local
misspecification of the moment in/equalities also.
Finally, several recent works in statistical decision theory advocate decision rules that minimize
maximum expected loss over KL neighborhoods of a reference model, motivated in part by Hansen
and Sargent’s work; see Watson and Holmes (2016) and references therein. Hansen and Marinacci
(2016) draw connections between this approach and decision theory in economics.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the setting and outlines our approach.
Section 3 illustrates how to implement our procedure in a simple but transparent entry game setting
and a dynamic discrete choice model. Section 4.1 presents results from convex analysis that justify
our procedure and Section 4.2 establishes the large-sample properties of plug-in estimators. Section
5 discusses the sharp bounds on the identified set of counterfactuals and Section 6 discusses local
sensitivity. Section 7 concludes.
2 Procedure
2.1 Setup
Consider the following description of a structural modeling exercise. The researcher observes a
sample of data, say X1, . . . , Xn. The researcher computes (i) a dP × 1 vector of targeted moments
Pˆ (e.g. a vector of choice probabilities or market shares), and possibly (ii) an estimator γˆ of an
auxiliary parameter (e.g. a law of motion of a Markov state). We assume that Pˆ and γˆ are consistent
estimators and let P0 and γ0 denote their probability limits.
The researcher’s structural model links P0 ∈ P ⊆ RdP and γ0 ∈ Γ (a metric space) to a dθ × 1
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vector of structural parameters θ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rdθ through the moment in/equality restrictions
EF [g1(U, θ, γ0)] ≤ P10 , (1)
EF [g2(U, θ, γ0)] = P20 , (2)
EF [g3(U, θ, γ0)] ≤ 0 , (3)
EF [g4(U, θ, γ0)] = 0 , (4)
where g1, . . . , g4 are vectors of moment conditions of dimension d1, . . . , d4 describing model-implied
moments (in g1 and g2) and additional equilibrium conditions (in g3 and g4), U is a vector of
unobservables with distribution F , and P0 is partitioned conformably as P0 = (P
′
10, P
′
20)
′.
The distribution F is typically not nonparametrically identified. Therefore, in common practice, a
seemingly reasonable and/or computationally convenient distribution, say F∗, is assumed by the
researcher and maintained throughout the analysis. We refer to F∗ as the researcher’s default or
benchmark specification.
Given F∗ and first-stage estimators γˆ and Pˆ = (Pˆ ′1, Pˆ ′2)′, the researcher would invert the sample
moment conditions
EF∗ [g1(U, θ, γˆ)] ≤ Pˆ1 , EF∗ [g2(U, θ, γˆ)] = Pˆ2 ,
EF∗ [g3(U, θ, γˆ)] ≤ 0 , EF∗ [g4(U, θ, γˆ)] = 0 ,
using, e.g., a minimum distance, GMM, or moment inequality criterion, to obtain an estimator θˆ
of θ. The researcher would then estimate a (scalar) counterfactual of interest
κ = EF [k(U, θ, γ0)]
(e.g. a counterfactual choice probability or counterfactual measure of expected profits) using the
plug-in estimator
κˆ = EF∗ [k(U, θˆ, γˆ)] .
We refer to this as the explicit-dependence case in what follows, as the function k depends explicitly
on the latent variables. Alternatively, the researcher may have a counterfactual of the form
κ = k(θ, γ0)
for which the researcher might use the plug-in estimator
κˆ = k(θˆ, γˆ) .
We refer to this as the implicit-dependence case in what follows, as the assumed distribution F∗
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will still have an effect on the estimator θˆ. Although the preceding discussion has assumed point
identification of θ and κ for sake of exposition, our methods are also robust to partial identification
of structural parameters and counterfactuals.
To fix ideas, consider an infinite-horizon dynamic discrete choice (DDC) model with a discrete
statespace, as in Rust (1987). In that model, U is the vector of payoff shocks in the period utility
function and F∗ is taken to be type-I extreme value for computational convenience. The vector of
moment conditions g2 specifies the model-implied conditional choice probabilities and the vector g4
specifies the fixed-point equation for the ex-ante value function. There are no inequalities, so the
remaining moment conditions involving g1 and g3 would be vacuous. The vector θ would consist of
structural parameters and pre- and post-intervention ex-ante value functions, similar to MPEC im-
plementations. Finally, γ would collect all of the transition matrices for the observable components
of the state. The counterfactual κ could be a counterfactual choice probability, a welfare measure,
or a measure of expected payoffs. Section 3 shows how to implement our procedure in DDC models
and presents a numerical example.
In the preceding description of a structural modeling exercise, the distribution F∗ is being used for
estimation of the structural parameter θ and for computation of the counterfactual κ. A natural
question that arises is: to what extent are the counterfactuals driven by the researcher’s choice
F∗, and to what extent do they rely on the underlying structure of the model? The challenge is
to address this question in a way that remains computationally tractable for empirically relevant
structural models.
We address this question as follows. Let U denote the support of U (equipped with its Borel
σ-algebra), let F denote the set of all probability distributions on U , and let N ⊂ F denote a
neighborhood of F∗. The neighborhood N will be nonparametric in our analysis: it will consist
of all probability distributions F that are within some well-defined “distance” of F∗. If this class
seems too large, the researcher may further disciple the class of distributions by incorporating shape
constraints, smoothness restrictions, or location/scale normalizations within the moment conditions
(1)–(4); see Section 2.4.
The object of interest is the interval [
κ(N ) , κ¯(N )] ,
where, in the explicit-dependence case
κ(N ) = inf
θ∈Θ,F∈N
EF [k(U, θ, γ0)] subject to (1)–(4) holding at (θ, F ) , and
κ¯(N ) = sup
θ∈Θ,F∈N
EF [k(U, θ, γ0)] subject to (1)–(4) holding at (θ, F )
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are respectively the smallest and largest values of the counterfactual obtained by varying θ over its
parameter space and F over the neighborhood N while respecting the model structure (1)–(4). Ex-
treme counterfactuals are defined similarly in the implicit-dependence case, replacing EF [k(U, θ, γ0)]
in the above display with k(θ, γ0).
Focusing on the extreme counterfactuals κ(N ) and κ¯(N ) has two advantages. First, it does not
require point-identification of θ under F∗ or any other candidate distribution F . Thus, it naturally
accommodates models with point- or partially-identified structural parameters and counterfactuals,
and we sidestep having to compute the full identified set of structural parameters. Moreover, like
Reguant (2016), we avoid having to compute all equilibria in models with multiple equilibria, only
those supporting the smallest and largest values of the counterfactual.
The main contribution of this paper is to allow researchers to conduct a global sensitivity analysis
as the parametric assumption F∗ is relaxed and F is allowed to vary over neighborhoods of various
size, while other structural features of the model are maintained. Key to computational tractability
of our procedure is how neighborhoods are defined, as outlined in the next subsection. Later, in
Section 6, we will also describe a measure of the local sensitivity of the counterfactual with respect
to F∗, which characterizes how counterfactuals vary over small neighborhoods of F∗.
2.2 Characterization via convex programming
This subsection gives an heuristic overview to fix ideas and notation. A formal justification is
presented in Section 4.1.
Consider computing κ(N ) and κ¯(N ) using an inner loop, where the counterfactual is minimized or
maximized over F ∈ N subject to the restrictions (1)–(4), and an outer loop optimizing over θ ∈ Θ.
The inner loops are infinite-dimensional optimization problems. Their computational tractability
hinges on how the neighborhood N is constructed. We follow the robustness literature in economics
pioneered by Hansen and Sargent and define nonparametric neighborhoods in terms of a type of
statistical divergence from F∗, thereby allowing the inner loops to be recast as low-dimensional
convex programs.
We consider neighborhoods that are constrained by φ-divergence from F∗:
Nδ = {F ∈ F : Dφ(F‖F∗) ≤ δ} ,
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with
Dφ(F‖F∗) =

∫
φ
(
dF
dF∗
)
dF∗ if F  F∗ ,
+∞ otherwise,
where F  F∗ denotes absolute continuity of F relative to F∗. Many default F∗, such as normal,
type-I extreme value, logistic, Pareto, and Fre´chet distributions have strictly positive (Lebesgue)
density over U , so the absolute continuity condition F  F∗ merely rules out F with mass points.
The function φ : [0,∞)→ R∪{+∞} is a convex function representing a cost of departing from F∗.
There are some easily verifiable technical conditions that the function φ must satisfy so as to be
compatible with the model, which we describe formally in Section 4.1.
To give some examples of neighborhoods, the function φ(x) = x log x − x + 1 corresponds to
Kullback–Leibler (KL) divergence:
Nδ =
{
F ∈ F :
∫
log
(
dF
dF∗
)
dF ≤ δ
}
.
KL divergence is used extensively in the robustness literature. However, it does require that the mo-
ment functions g1, . . . , g4 and counterfactual function k have quite thin tails under F∗, as discussed
further in Section 4.1. Weaker moment conditions are required for the function φ(x) = x
p−1−p(x−1)
p(p−1)
with index p > 1, which corresponds to neighborhoods constrained by Cressie–Read divergence
(equivalently, by Lp divergence, α-divergence, or Renyi divergence). Choosing p = 2 yields neigh-
borhoods constrained by χ2 (or Pearson) divergence:
Nδ =
{
F ∈ F : 1
2
∫ (
dF
dF∗
− 1
)2
dF∗ ≤ δ
}
.
We also found it useful to work with a hybrid of KL and χ2 divergence, whose corresponding φ
function is
φ(x) =
[
x log x− x+ 1 x ≤ e ,
1
2e(x− e)2 + (x− e) + 1 x > e ,
where e denotes Euler’s number. Hybrid divergence retains some attractive features of KL diver-
gence but the technical conditions underlying the duality results are satisfied for a much broader
class of models and benchmark distributions F∗.
In the explicit-dependence case, the smallest and largest values of the counterfactual obtained as
we vary F ∈ Nδ (subject to the restrictions imposed by the model) at any fixed θ are
κδ(θ; γ0, P0) = inf
F∈Nδ
EF [k(U, θ, γ0)] subject to (1)–(4) holding at (θ, F ) , and
κ¯δ(θ; γ0, P0) = sup
F∈Nδ
EF [k(U, θ, γ0)] subject to (1)–(4) holding at (θ, F )
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with the understanding that κδ(θ; γ0, P0) = +∞ and κ¯δ(θ; γ0, P0) = −∞ if there exists no distribu-
tion in Nδ for which (1)–(4) hold. Although these are infinite-dimensional optimization problems,
their dual representations are low-dimensional convex programs.
We state the dual programs of κδ(θ; γ, P ) and κ¯δ(θ; γ, P ) for now as a result; Section 4.1 provides a
formal statement. Let g = (g′1, . . . , g′4)′ denote the vector of moment functions and let d =
∑4
i=1 di.
Partition λ ∈ Rd as λ = (λ′1, λ′2, λ′3, λ′4)′ ∈ Λ := Rd1+ ×Rd2 ×Rd3+ ×Rd4 . The vector λ consists of the
Lagrange multipliers on the moment conditions (1)–(4); the remaining multipliers are η ∈ R+ for
the constraint on the condition Dφ(F‖F∗) ≤ δ and ζ ∈ R for the constraint that F must integrate
to unity. Let (ηφ)?(x) = supt≥0:ηφ(t)<+∞(tx− ηφ(t)) denote the convex conjugate of ηφ.
Result 2.1 The dual programs of κδ(θ; γ, P ) and κ¯δ(θ; γ, P ) are
κ?δ(θ; γ, P ) = sup
η≥0,ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
−EF∗
[
(ηφ)?(−k(U, θ, γ)− ζ − λ′g(U, θ, γ))
]
− ηδ − ζ − λ′12P , (5)
κ¯?δ(θ; γ, P ) = inf
η≥0,ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
EF∗
[
(ηφ)?(k(U, θ, γ)− ζ − λ′g(U, θ, γ))
]
+ ηδ + ζ + λ′12P , (6)
where λ12 = (λ
′
1, λ
′
2)
′. In particular, for KL neighborhoods:
κ?δ(θ; γ, P ) = sup
η>0,λ∈Λ
−η logEF∗
[
e−η
−1(k(U,θ,γ)+λ′g(U,θ,γ))
]
− ηδ − λ′12P , (7)
κ¯?δ(θ; γ, P ) = inf
η>0,λ∈Λ
η logEF∗
[
eη
−1(k(U,θ,γ)−λ′g(U,θ,γ))
]
+ ηδ + λ′12P , (8)
and for hybrid neighborhoods:
κ?δ(θ; γ, P ) = sup
η>0,ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
−ηEF∗
[
Ψ
(
− η−1 (k(U, θ, γ) + ζ + λ′g(U, θ, γ)) )]− ηδ − ζ − λ′12P , (9)
κ¯?δ(θ; γ, P ) = inf
η>0,ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
ηEF∗
[
Ψ
(
η−1
(
k(U, θ, γ)− ζ − λ′g(U, θ, γ)) )]+ ηδ + ζ + λ′12P , (10)
where
Ψ(x) =
[
ex − 1 x ≤ 1 ,
e
2(x
2 + 1)− 1 x > 1 . (11)
The expectations in the dual programs are all under F∗, so κ?δ and κ¯
?
δ can be computed in closed
form, as for the game example in Section 3, or otherwise numerically. Gradients and Hessians may
also be available in closed form, facilitating fast optimization. Indeed, evaluation of κ?δ and κ¯
?
δ
may be only marginally more computationally costly than evaluation of a criterion function for
estimating θ.
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By weak duality, the inequalities
κ?δ(θ; γ, P ) ≤ κδ(θ; γ, P ) , κ¯δ(θ; γ, P ) ≤ κ¯?δ(θ; γ, P )
always hold. Therefore, the dual problems always provide (possibly conservative) upper and lower
bounds for the extreme counterfactuals at any given θ. We say that strong duality holds when the
primal and dual problems are equal. Under a mild condition on the moments, strong duality may
be verified via the convex program
δ?(θ; γ, P ) = sup
ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
−EF∗
[
φ?(−ζ − λ′g(U, θ, γ))
]
− ζ − λ′12P . (12)
In particular, for KL divergence
δ?(θ; γ, P ) = sup
λ∈Λ
− logEF∗
[
e−λ
′g(U,θ,γ)
]
− λ′12P , (13)
and for hybrid divergence
δ?(θ; γ, P ) = sup
ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
−EF∗ [Ψ (−ζ − λ′g(U, θ, γ))]− ζ − λ′12P . (14)
The expectations in the above displays are again under F∗ and may therefore be computed in closed
form for certain models or otherwise numerically.
When δ?(θ; γ, P ) < ∞, the program δ? identifies a distribution Fθ,γ,P that minimizes Dφ(·‖F∗)
among all distributions satisfying the constraints (1)–(4) at (θ, γ, P ). If δ?(θ; γ, P ) ≤ δ then there
exists at least one distribution satisfying (1)–(4) at (θ, γ, P ) that belongs to Nδ. If the inequal-
ity is strict, strong duality holds under a mild constraint qualification condition and κ?δ and
κ¯?δ give the correct values for the inner loop at θ. On the other hand, if δ
?(θ, γ, P ) = δ, then
Fθ,γ,P is the unique distribution in Nδ satisfying the moment conditions at (θ, γ, P ), in which case
κδ(θ; γ, P ) = κ¯δ(θ; γ, P ) = EFθ,γ,P [k(U, θ, γ)] = EF∗ [mθ,γ,P (U)k(U, θ, γ)] where mθ,γ,P denotes the
Radon–Nikodym derivative of Fθ,γ,P with respect to F∗. In particular, for KL divergence
mθ,γ,P (U) =
e−λ
′
θ,γ,P g(U,θ,γ)
EF∗ [e−λ
′
θ,γ,P g(U,θ,γ)]
,
where λθ,γ,P solves (13), and for hybrid divergence
mθ,γ,P (U) = Ψ˙
(−ζθ,γ,P − λ′θ,γ,P g(U, θ, γ)) ,
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where (ζθ,γ,P , λθ,γ,P ) solves (14) and
Ψ˙(x) =
[
ex x ≤ 1 ,
ex x > 1 .
2.3 Estimation
The preceding description provides roadmap for how to estimate the extreme counterfactuals,
given first-stage estimates (γˆ, Pˆ ) of (γ0, P0). In the explicit-dependence case (where k depends
non-trivially on u), define the sample criterion functions
Kˆδ(θ) =

κ?δ(θ; γˆ, Pˆ )
EFθ,γˆ,Pˆ [k(U, θ, γˆ)]
+∞ ,
, Kˆδ(θ) =

κ¯?δ(θ; γˆ, Pˆ ) if δ
?(θ; γˆ, Pˆ ) < δ,
EFθ,γˆ,Pˆ [k(U, θ, γˆ)] if δ?(θ; γˆ, Pˆ ) = δ,
−∞ if δ?(θ; γˆ, Pˆ ) > δ.
Note that the knife-edge case δ?(θ; γˆ, Pˆ ) = δ will almost certainly never occur if δ? is computed by
numerical optimization. In the implicit-dependence case (where k does not depend on u), then the
sample criterion functions simplify to
Kˆδ(θ) =
[
k(θ, γˆ)
+∞ , Kˆδ(θ) =
[
k(θ, γˆ) if δ?(θ; γˆ, Pˆ ) ≤ δ,
−∞ if δ?(θ; γˆ, Pˆ ) > δ.
The estimators of the smallest and largest counterfactuals are obtained by optimizing the criterion
functions Kˆδ and Kˆδ with respect to θ:
κˆ(Nδ) = inf
θ∈Θ
Kˆδ(θ) , ˆ¯κ(Nδ) = sup
θ∈Θ
Kˆδ(θ) .
If (γ0, P0) are known then we may to compute the smallest and largest counterfactuals κ(Nδ) and
κ¯(Nδ) by simply replacing (γˆ, Pˆ ) with (γ0, P0) in the above description.
In Section 4.2, we show that the plug-in estimators κˆ(Nδ) and ˆ¯κ(Nδ) are consistent estimators of
the extreme counterfactuals κ(Nδ) and κ¯(Nδ) and we establish their joint asymptotic distribution.
The distribution will typically be nonstandard, however, as extreme counterfactuals may occur
under multiple distributions in Nδ and at multiple structural parameter values. Nevertheless, one
may still use subsampling or various modified bootstraps to perform inference on the extreme
counterfactuals.
When δ is very small and the model is sufficiently regular, κˆ(Nδ) and ˆ¯κ(Nδ) may be approximated
as κˆ−√sˆδ and κˆ+√sˆδ, respectively, where sˆ is an estimate of local sensitivity; see Section 6.
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2.4 Shape restrictions
The moment conditions (1)–(4) may also contain further shape restrictions on F . Examples include:
(i) location normalizations, e.g. EF [U ] = 0 or EF [1l{Ui ≤ 0}] = 12 for each entry Ui of U for a median
normalization; (ii) scale normalizations, e.g. EF [U2i ] = 1 or EF [1l{Ui ≤ a}] − EF [1l{Ui ≤ −a}] = b
for a normalization of the inter-quantile range; (iii) covariance normalizations, e.g. EF [UU ′] = I,
or bounds, e.g. EF [UU ′] ≤ Σ; and (iv) smoothness, e.g. EF [1l{Ui ≤ ak+1}] − EF [1l{Ui ≤ ak}] ≤ C
for a1 < a2 < . . . < aK . Researchers may add and remove shape restrictions as appropriate to
investigate how such restrictions affect the sets of counterfactuals.
3 Numerical examples
3.1 Discrete game of complete information
To illustrate our procedure in a simple and transparent way, we consider a complete-information
entry game similar to that studied by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), Berry (1992), and Tamer
(2003). Payoffs are described in Table 1.
Firm 2
0 1
Firm 1
0 (0, 0) (0, β2 + βz + U2)
1 (β1 + βz + U1, 0) (β1 + βz −∆ + U1, β2 + βz −∆ + U2)
Table 1: Payoff matrix for (Firm 1, Firm 2) when Z = z.
In this specification, Z ∈ {0, 1, 2} denotes a market-specific regressor and U = (U1, U2)′ is a
random vector representing unobserved (to the econometrician but not to the firms) profits which
is distributed independently of Z. The structural parameters are (β1, β2, β,∆) where β1 and β2
represent firm-specific fixed costs and ∆ (assumed positive) represents a loss of profitability from
competing as a duopolist. The solution concept is restricted to equilibria in pure strategies.
The econometrician observes choice probabilities of the four market structures (conditional on Z).
A standard approach for estimation is to match the observed conditional choice probabilities with
the model-implied conditional choice probabilities. As the model is incomplete—there are certain
realizations of U for which there are two equilibria in pure strategies (Firm 1 enters and Firm 2 does
not, or vice versa)—moment inequality methods are typically used so as to be robust to potential
misspecification of the equilibrium selection mechanism.
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Nevertheless, it is often the case in applied work that strong parametric assumptions are made
about the distribution of payoff shocks to map the structural parameters θ into model-implied
conditional choice probabilities. For example, Berry (1992) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) both
assume U is distributed as bivariate normal.4 Given the emphasis on robustness with respect to
equilibrium selection, it seems natural to also question the sensitivity of counterfactuals to the
researcher’s assumed parametric distribution of unobservables.
Suppose the researcher wants to investigate the effect of a tax on market structure. Payoffs under the
tax are presented in Table 2. We will focus on the conditional probability of observing a monopoly,
though our approach could be used equally for other choice probabilities or measures of expected
firm profits.
Firm 2
0 1
Firm 1
0 (0, 0) (0, β2 + βz − τ + U2)
1 (β1 + βz − τ + U1, 0) (β1 + βz −∆ + U1, β2 + βz −∆ + U2)
Table 2: Counterfactual payoff matrix for (Firm 1, Firm 2) when Z = z.
Under the counterfactual payoffs described in Table 2, neither firm enters if Uj ≤ τ − βj − βz for
j = 1, 2 where τ > 0 is the tax, and both firms enter (duopoly) if Uj ≥ ∆ − βj − βz for j = 1, 2.
The moment condition defining the counterfactual of interest is therefore
k(U, θ; z) = 1− 1l{(U1 ≤ τ − β1 − βz; U2 ≤ τ − β2 − βz)
∪ (U1 ≥ ∆− β1 − βz; U2 ≥ ∆− β2 − βz)}
and EF [k(U, θ; z)] is the probability of observing a monopoly under the tax when Z = z.
To describe the moment functions g1 and g2, let p(0, 0|z), p(0, 1|z), p(1, 0|z), and p(1, 1|z) denote
the model-implied conditional choice probabilities for z ∈ {0, 1, 2}. The model predicts a unique
equilibrium in pure strategies for p(0, 0|z) and p(1, 1|z), so there are six equality restrictions. We
follow convention and construct (standard) inequalities for the conditional choice probabilities
p(0, 1|z) and p(1, 0|z). This yields six equality restrictions and six inequality restrictions:
g1(U, θ) =

−1l{U1≥−β1;U2≤∆−β2}
−1l{U1≤∆−β1;U2≥−β2}
−1l{U1≥−β1−β;U2≤∆−β2−β}
−1l{U1≤∆−β1−β;U2≥−β2−β}
−1l{U1≥−β1−2β;U2≤∆−β2−2β}
−1l{U1≤∆−β1−2β;U2≥−β2−2β}

, g2(U, θ) =

−1l{U1≤−β1;U2≤−β2}
−1l{U1≥∆−β1;U2≥∆−β2}
−1l{U1≤−β1−β;U2≤−β2−β}
−1l{U1≥∆−β1−β;U2≥∆−β2−β}
−1l{U1≤−β1−2β;U2≤−β2−2β}
−1l{U1≥∆−β1−2β;U2≥∆−β2−2β}

.
4There are some exceptions, e.g., Aradillas-Lopez (2011).
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The reduced-form parameter Pˆ1 stacks the (negative of the) observed conditional probabilities of
(0, 1) and (1, 0) and Pˆ2 stacks the (negative of the) observed conditional probabilities of (0, 0) and
(1, 1). There is no auxiliary parameter (i.e., no γ) in this setting.
As a benchmark specification, we assume U ∼ N(0, I2) under F∗. Note, however, that we will allow
for arbitrary correlation between U1 and U2 as the neighborhoods expand. We impose a location
normalization EF [U ] = 0 using
g4(U, θ) =
[
U1 U2
]′
.
We also impose a scale normalization by setting β = 1. Alternatively, one could impose a scale
normalization on the variance or inter-quantile range of U1 and U2. In total, we have 6 inequality
constraints and 8 equality constraints. The vector of structural parameters is θ = (β1, β2,∆).
5
We define neighborhoods via KL divergence relative to F∗. Although the moment functions in g4
are unbounded, this neighborhood definition is still compatible with the key regularity condition
underlying our procedure (Assumption Φ in Section 4.1). With this notion of divergence, the cri-
terion functions for the dual programs κ?, κ¯?, and δ? as well as the local sensitivity measure s can
all be computed in closed form. Full details are deferred to Appendix A.1.
Suppose that the observed conditional probabilities of observing the various market structures
(pre-intervention) are as described in Table 3.
Z (0, 0) (1, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1)
0 0.619 0.003 0.226 0.152
1 0.175 0.075 0.450 0.300
2 0.013 0.427 0.335 0.225
Table 3: Observed conditional probabilities.
Matching the model-implied conditional choice probabilities under F∗ to the observed conditional
choice probabilities as above yields parameter estimates of βˆ1 = −0.70, βˆ2 = −0.90, and ∆ˆ = 0.80
(there are enough equality restrictions to point-identify these parameters under F∗). We will focus on
the probability of observing a monopoly when Z = 1, where pre-intervention presence of monopolies
is highest. Suppose that the tax is τ = 1.5. The counterfactual probability of a monopoly under
F∗ at θˆ is κˆ = 0.143. Therefore, under the independent bivariate normal assumption, the model
predicts the probability of observing a monopoly when Z = 1 will fall from 0.750 to 0.143 under
the tax. How reliant is this prediction on the assumed distribution of unobserved profits?
5We could have allowed the duopoly cost to be ∆1 and ∆2 for firms 1 and 2, respectively. However, when ∆1−τ < 0
and ∆2− τ > 0 (or vice versa) there is no equilibrium in pure strategies for certain values of U for the game in Table
2. We therefore impose the restriction ∆1 = ∆2 = ∆ and maintain pure-strategy equilibrium as the solution concept.
One could alternatively consider equilibria in mixed strategies and modify the moment conditions accordingly.
16
Figure 1: Solid lines: κˆ(Nδ) and ˆ¯κ(Nδ) for the counterfactual probability of observing
a monopoly under a tax when Z = 1. Dashed line: estimated counterfactual under the
N(0, I2) parametric benchmark. Dotted line: pre-tax probability of observing a monopoly.
Dot-dashed line: bounds based on extrapolating a local sensitivity measure.
To answer this question, Figure 1 plots the upper and lower bounds of the set of counterfactuals over
KL neighborhoods of F∗ of various sizes. These bounds represent the smallest and largest values
of the counterfactual that can be obtained under a distribution in Nδ which is constrained so that
(i) the model explains the pre-intervention conditional choice probabilities in Table 3, and (ii) the
mean-zero restriction on U holds. As can be seen, the bounds are equal to the counterfactual under
F∗ when δ = 0. As δ increases the bounds expand until they span the interval [0, 0.379], which
represents the identified set of the counterfactual probability of observing a monopoly when Z = 1.
To interpret the neighborhood size δ, consider the benchmark specification where F∗ is N(0, I2).
A shift in the fix cost parameters (β1, β2)
′ could be offset by shifting the mean from 0 to µ, say.
The KL divergence between the N(0, I2) distribution and N(µ, I2) distribution is
1
2‖µ‖2. So, a
neighborhood of size δ = 12 would contain distributions that are as far from F∗ as distributions that
shift fixed costs of one of the firms by one unit of profits. Similarly, neighborhoods of size δ = 0.125
contain distributions as far from F∗ as distributions that shift fixed costs of one of the firms by half
a unit of profits. With this in mind, we see that the lower bound of 0 is achieved by δ = 0.2. Yet
there are distributions equally close to F∗ under which the probability of observing a monopoly
would be around 0.32. The neighborhoods continue to expand upwards until the upper bound of
0.379 is achieved, slightly over half the probability of observing a monopoly without the tax.
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Figure 1 also plots the bounds that are obtained by extrapolating a measure of local sensitivity of
the counterfactual with respect to F∗ (see Section 6 and Appendix A.1 for computational details).
Extrapolation gives a good approximation when δ is very small. However, the approximation breaks
down outside of very small neighborhoods. The reason is that at F∗ none of the moment equality
restrictions are binding. Thus, none of the inequality restrictions are relevant in characterizing
local sensitivity. The moment inequality restrictions are, however, relevant outside of very small
neighborhoods of F∗. These inequality restrictions further constrain the sets of distributions and,
therefore, the set of counterfactuals.
The preceding exercise could be repeated under further restrictions on the parameter space Θ or
by imposing additional shape constraints on the class of distributions F . One can then explore the
extent to which these restrictions further sharpen the identified sets for counterfactuals.
3.2 Dynamic discrete choice
As a second numerical illustration, we consider a dynamic discrete choice (DDC) model following
Rust (1987). The DDC literature is extensive; see Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) and Arcidiacono
and Ellickson (2011) for surveys. The basic setup of a discrete-time, infinite-horizon model is as
follows. At each date t, agent i chooses ai,t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , na} so as to maximize discounted expected
payoffs. There is an observable state xi,t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , nx} which evolves as a controlled Markov
process with transition kernel M . The agent’s problem can be summarized by the ex-ante value
function
V (xi,t) = EF
[
max
a
(
pi(a, xi,t; θpi) + Ui,t(a) + βEM [V (xi,t+1)|xi,t, a]
)]
,
where pi is a deterministic per-period payoff indexed by parameters θpi, β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount
factor, and Ui,t = (Ui,t(0), . . . , Ui,t(na))
′ is a Rna+1-valued vector of latent (to the econometrician)
payoff shocks that are independently (of xi,t) and identically distributed with distribution F . The
testable implications of the model are summarized by the conditional choice probabilities (CCPs)
p(a|xit) = EF
[
1l
{
pi(a, xi,t; θpi) + Ui,t(a) + βEM [V (xi,t+1)|xi,t, a]
≥ max
a′
(
pi(a′, xi,t; θpi) + Ui,t(a′) + βEM [V (xi,t+1)|xi,t, a′]
)}]
, a = 0, . . . , na .
Researchers typically observe panel data on (xi,t, ai,t) and estimate structural parameters assuming
the latent utility shocks have a particular parametric distribution, say F∗.6 A standard parametric
assumption used in the estimation procedures of Rust (1987) and Hotz and Miller (1993) is that
6A few papers study estimation without parametric assumptions on the distribution of payoff shocks. See Norets
and Tang (2014) for the case of models with finite states, as above, and Blevins (2014), Chen (2017), and Buchholz,
Shum, and Xu (2018) for models with continuous states.
18
the payoff shocks are i.i.d. type-I extreme value. This assumption is motivated by computational
considerations, as it leads to closed-form expressions for expectations of maxima. Given an estimate
of θpi, the dynamic program can be solved again under counterfactual changes to the environment
to investigate the effect on choice probabilities, welfare, or other quantities of interest. As before,
we see that the researcher’s parametric assumption F∗ plays a role both at the estimation stage
and again when solving the dynamic program to compute counterfactuals.
To map this setup into our framework, identify V with a nx-vector v solving the moment condition
EF∗
[
max
a
(
pi(a; θpi) + Ui,t(a) + βMav
)
− v
]
= 0 , (15)
where pi(a; θpi) = (pi(a, 1; θpi), . . . , pi(a, nx; θpi))
′, Ma is the nx × nx transition matrix representing
M(xi,t+1|xi,t, a), and the maximum is applied row-wise. The CCPs p(a|x) may be identified with a
nx-vector pa which solves the moment condition
EF∗
[
1l
{
pi(a; θpi) + Ui,t(a) + βMav ≥ max
a′
(
pi(a′; θpi) + Ui,t(a′) + βMa′v
)}]
= pa , (16)
where the maximum, inequality, and indicator function are all applied row-wise. Consider a coun-
terfactual transforming payoffs pi to p˜i and/or transition probabilities Ma to M˜a. The value function
V˜ under the counterfactual may be identified with a nx-vector v˜ solving the moment condition
EF∗
[
max
a
(
p˜i(a; θpi) + Ui,t(a) + βM˜av˜
)
− v˜
]
= 0 , (17)
where p˜i(a; θpi) = (p˜i(a, 1; θpi), . . . , p˜i(a, nx; θpi))
′.
In the notation of Section 2, there are no inequalities so g1, g3, and P1 are vacuous. The function
g2 collects the model-implied conditional choice probabilities from equation (16) for a = 1, . . . , na
and the vector Pˆ2 = (pˆ
′
1, . . . , pˆ
′
na)
′ collects the estimated CCPs. The auxiliary parameter is γˆ =
(Mˆ0, . . . , Mˆna). Both Pˆ2 and γˆ are computed from the panel of data on (xi,t, ai,t). The function g4
collects the fixed-point equations (15) and (17) for v and v˜, respectively. Finally, θ = (θ′pi, v′, v˜′)′.
Our approach to augmenting the parameter space and adding equilibrium conditions for v and v˜ is
somewhat similar to MPEC implementations. As our methods are robust to partial identification,
one could also treat β as unknown and include it as a component of θ. In the example below
we follow much of the literature and treat β as known, however. One could add further moment
conditions embodying location/scale normalizations or smoothness restrictions to g4, as described
in Section 2.4. Unlike the game example, we do not impose a mean-zero normalization on U here.
We use a dynamic model of monopolist entry and exit from Kalouptsidi, Scott, and Souza-Rodrigues
(2017) as a numerical example. Each period a monopolist decides whether to participate (a = 1)
or not participate (a = 0) in a market. The observed state is xi,t = (si,t, ai,t−1)′ where si,t is a
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p(1|x) (H, 0) (M, 0) (L, 0) (H, 1) (M, 1) (L, 1)
Estimated 0.9361 0.8748 0.7299 0.9999 0.8091 0.0048
Counterfactual 0.9495 0.9027 0.8033 0.9999 0.6959 0.0029
Table 4: Estimated CCPs (Pˆ2) and counterfactual CCPs (κˆ) under F∗.
market-level variable (high, medium or low) which evolves exogenously. Payoffs are
pi(a, xi,t; θpi) =
[
−ace if ai,t−1 = 0 ,
a(pi1(si,t; θpi)) + (1− a)cs if ai,t−1 = 1 ,
where ce is an entry cost, cs is scrap value, and variable profits pi1(s; θpi) are
pi1(s; θpi) =
(x(s)− cm)2
4cd
− cf ,
where cf is a fixed cost, cm is the monopolist’s constant marginal cost, and x(s) and cd are the
intercept the slope, respectively, of the linear demand curve faced by the monopolist in state s. As
in Kalouptsidi et al. (2017), we take x(s) = 20, 17, and 12 in the high, medium, and low states,
respectively. We also normalize β = 0.95 and φs = 10, so θpi = (cd, ce, cf , cm).
Suppose we observe a panel of data on (xi,t, ai,t) from which we estimate CCPs (see Table 4) and
transition law q for s (the matrices M0 and M1 are known up to q):
qˆ(st+1|st) =
 0.40 0.35 0.250.30 0.40 0.30
0.20 0.20 0.60
 ,
where the first row/column correspond to the high state and the third to the low state. Fixing F∗ so
that the payoff shocks are type-I extreme value, we invert the estimated CCPs to obtain estimates
θˆpi = (11.0, 9.0, 5.5, 1.5).
We wish to investigate the effect of a subsidy that reduces the cost of entry by 0.9 units, a reduction
of 10%. Counterfactual CCPs displayed in Table 4 are obtained by solving the model using (θˆpi, F∗).
How reliant are the counterfactual CCPs on the assumed distribution of payoff shocks?
To investigate sensitivity, we apply our procedure over neighborhoods of F∗ of various sizes. We
focus on the first two counterfactual CCPs in Table 4, which represent the conditional probabilities
of an inactive monopolist entering the market when the market-level state is high and medium,
respectively. As the type-I extreme value distribution has slightly fatter tails than the normal
distribution used in the game example, here we constrain neighborhoods by hybrid divergence,
rather than KL divergence, so as to satisfy the key regularity condition underlying our procedure
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Figure 2: Solid lines: κˆ(Nδ) and ˆ¯κ(Nδ) for the entry CCP (i.e., P (1|s, a = 0)) by market-
level state. Dashed line: estimated counterfactual under the type-I extreme value parametric
benchmark. Dotted line: observed CCP without the subsidy. Dot-dashed line: bounds based
on extrapolating a local sensitivity measure.
(Assumption Φ in Section 4.1).7 Figure 2 plots the smallest and largest counterfactuals that could
be obtained under distributions in Nδ that explain the CCPs in the first line of Table 4. Both
figures show that the counterfactual CCPs are bounded below by the CCPs without the subsidy.
The counterfactual CCP in the medium state is constrained above, however, showing that the
model has some structure that disciplines the set of counterfactual predictions.
To interpret the neighborhood size δ, the hybrid divergence between a type-I extreme value dis-
tribution with mean zero and type-I extreme value distribution with location shifted by µ units
behaves like 12µ
2 for small values of µ. So, a neighborhood of size δ = 0.10 contains distributions
that are as far from F∗ as distributions that have a location shift of around 0.45 profit units, a mag-
nitude equivalent to half the size of the subsidy. Similarly, neighborhoods of size δ = 0.025 contain
distributions that are as far from F∗ as distributions that have a location shift around one quarter
the size of the subsidy. With this in mind, we see that the lower bound for the counterfactual CCP
in the high state is achieved by around δ = 0.025, the lower and upper bounds for the CCPs in the
medium state are attained by around δ = 0.05, and the upper bound of 1 for the CCP in the high
7The moment conditions g4 grow like ‖U‖ for large values of ‖U‖. Compatibility with KL divergence requires that
EF∗ [ec‖U‖] <∞ for each c > 0; see Section 4.1. The type-I extreme value distribution does not satisfy this condition
as it tails are too thick. It does, however, satisfy the weaker condition EF∗ [‖U‖2] <∞ required by hybrid divergence.
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state is achieved by around δ = 0.15. The bounds for the CCP in the high state expand more slowly
than for the medium state, indicating that this counterfactual CCP is relatively less sensitive to
specification of F∗. After δ = 0.15, the bounds for both counterfactual CCPs are stable and equal
to the limits of the endpoints of their respective identified sets.
Figure 2 also plots the bounds that are obtained by extrapolating a local sensitivity measure
(see Section 6 and Appendix A.2 for computational details). The measure is sˆ = 0.020 for the
counterfactual CCP in the high state and sˆ = 0.035 for the medium state, showing again that
the counterfactual CCP in the high state is relatively less sensitive to specification of F∗. As with
the game example, extrapolation gives a good approximation when δ is very small. Outside of
small neighborhoods, however, these sets fail to capture the true nature of the identified sets of
counterfactual CCPs. One reason for this is that extrapolation produces bounds that are symmetric
around the counterfactual at F∗, whereas the upper panel of Figure 2 reveals asymmetries in the
true set of counterfactuals obtained using our procedure.
We close this section by comparing our approach with Norets and Tang (2014), who study identified
sets of CCPs in dynamic binary choice models without parametric assumptions on F . They eliminate
the nuisance distribution via a reparameterization and a linear program, which is solved for each
θpi-counterfactual CCP pair. If one’s aim is to recover the identified set of counterfactual CCPs,
then their approach is computationally lighter than ours as it uses linear programming and involves
no numerical integration. However, their analysis is more restrictive than ours, as it is specific to
counterfactual CCPs in dynamic binary choice models whereas we allow for general counterfactuals
(e.g. welfare measures, expected profits, and so on) in dynamic multinomial choice models. We also
accommodate a broader range of location/scale normalizations and shape restrictions.
4 Theory
In this section we first outline some theoretical results which underlie the dual representation of
the extreme counterfactuals and justify our choice of criterion function. We then go on to discuss
estimation and inference results.
4.1 Duality
To ensure the dual representations are well defined, we impose two easily verifiable conditions on the
cost function φ and its compatibility with the thickness of the tails of the distribution of g1, . . . , g4
and k under F∗.
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To introduce the condition, let ψ(x) = φ?(x) − x where φ?(x) = supt≥0:φ(t)<+∞(tx − φ(t)) is the
convex conjugate of φ. Define
E = {f : U → R such that EF∗ [ψ(c|f(U)|)] <∞ for all c > 0} .
The space E is an Orlicz class of functions. Further details are deferred to Appendix C. For now,
we just compare E with Lp spaces, namely Lp(F∗) = {f : U → R such that EF∗ [|f(U)|p] <∞} for
1 ≤ p <∞ and the space of (essentially) bounded functions when p =∞. For KL neighborhoods,
we have E = {f : U → R : EF∗ [ec|f(U)|] < ∞ for all c > 0}, so L∞(F∗) ⊂ E ⊂ Lp(F∗) for each
p <∞. For φ corresponding to Cressie–Read divergence with exponent p > 1, we have E = Lq(F∗)
where 1p +
1
q = 1. Moreover, E = L2(F∗) for hybrid and χ2 divergence.
Assumption Φ
(i) φ : [0,∞) → R ∪ {+∞} is twice continuously differentiable on (0,∞) and strictly convex,
φ(1) = φ′(1) = 0, φ(0) < +∞, limx→∞ x−1φ(x) = +∞, limx↓0 φ′(x) < 0, limx→∞ φ′(x) > 0,
and limx→∞ xφ′(x)/φ(x) < +∞.
(ii) k(·; θ, γ) and each entry of g(·; θ, γ) belong to E for each θ ∈ Θ and γ ∈ Γ.
Assumption Φ(i) is satisfied by functions inducing KL, Cressie–Read, χ2, and hybrid divergence,
among many others. However, it rules out φ(x) = − log x + x − 1 used in empirical likelihood. In
view of Assumption Φ(i), we may extend the domain of φ so that φ(x) = +∞ if x < 0.
Assumption Φ(ii) describes a trade-off between the tail-thickness of F ∈ Nδ and the growth of
k and ‖g‖ which ensures the expectations in (1)–(4) are well defined.8 As k, g, and F∗ are all
specified by the researcher, this condition is easily verified. In particular, Assumption Φ(ii) holds
for KL, Cressie–Read, χ2, and hybrid divergence under a strong Crame´r-type condition, namely
that EF∗ [ec|k(U,θ,γ)|] and EF∗ [ec‖g(U,θ,γ)‖] are finite for all c > 0 and all (θ, γ). This condition is
satisfied, e.g., when (a) k and g are bounded, or (b) k and g are additively separable in U and
the researcher’s choice F∗ is a sufficiently thin-tailed distribution, e.g. normal. If this Crame´r-type
condition fails, then a stronger divergence than KL must be used. For instance, if k and each entry
of g all have finite second moments under F∗ then we may use χ2 or hybrid divergence.
Remark 4.1 There is a tradeoff between the class of distributions over unobservables and the
thickness of the tails of moment functions. A key innovation of Schennach (2014) is to allow for
moment functions that are unbounded. Schennach (2014) uses φ corresponding to KL divergence
but adjusts the reference measure (F∗ in our notation) appropriately. In contrast, our objective is to
8Assumption Φ is similar to conditions justifying duality results in generalized empirical likelihood estimation
(see, e.g., Komunjer and Ragusa (2016)) where F∗ would be replaced by the data-generating probability measure.
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examine sensitivity to departures from the researcher’s default choice F∗. We therefore keep F∗ as
the reference measure but modify φ appropriately. Li (2018) uses truncation to extend the framework
of Ekeland et al. (2010) to accommodate unbounded moments, which introduces a tuning parameter.
Rather than modify the model through truncation, our approach restricts attention to sufficiently
thin-tailed classes of distributions. As we show in Section 5, these classes are sufficiently rich that
our procedure delivers sharp bounds on the identified set of counterfactuals over large neighborhoods.
A sufficient condition for strong duality is the following Slater condition. Let 0di denote a di × 1
vector of zeros and C = Rd1+ × {0d2} × Rd3+ × {0d4}. Also let N∞ = {F ∈ F : Dφ(F‖F∗) <∞}.
Definition 4.1 Condition S holds at (θ, γ, P ) if (P ′, 0′d3+d4)
′ ∈ int({EF [g(U, θ, γ)] : F ∈ N∞}+C).
Condition S requires that there exist F “in the interior” of N∞ under which conditions (1)–(4) hold
at (θ, γ, P ). If there are no inequalities, then Condition S reduces to (P ′2, 0′d4)
′ ∈ int({EF [g(U, θ, γ)] :
F ∈ N∞}). If there are only inequalities, then Condition S holds if there exists a distribution
F ∈ N∞ such that EF [g(U, θ, γ)] < (P ′1, 0′d3)′ (where the strict inequality holds element-wise).
It is straightforward to relax condition S by replacing “interior” with “relative interior” so as
to accommodate moment functions that become linearly dependent at certain parameter values.
Indeed, the dual representations all remain valid under this weaker condition. However, weakening
the condition somewhat complicates the derivation of the estimation and inference results.
Lemma 4.1 Let Assumption Φ hold. Then: the duals of κδ(θ; γ, P ) and κ¯δ(θ; γ, P ) in the explicit-
dependence case are the programs κ?δ(θ; γ, P ) and κ¯
?
δ(θ; γ, P ) defined in equations (5) and (6). If
Condition S also holds at (θ, γ, P ) and δ?(θ; γ, P ) < δ, then: the supremum can be taken over
(η, ζ, λ) ∈ (0,∞) × R × Λ, and the dual programs reduce to the programs in equations (7) and (8)
for KL neighborhoods and (9) and (10) for hybrid neighborhoods.
Recall that Fθ,γ,P minimizesDφ(F‖F∗) subject to the restrictions (1)–(4) at (θ, γ, P ). In the explicit-
dependence case, define
Kδ(θ; γ, P ) =

κ?δ(θ; γ, P )
EFθ,γ,P [k(U, θ, γ)]
+∞ ,
, Kδ(θ; γ, P ) =

κ¯?δ(θ; γ, P ) if δ
?(θ; γ, P ) < δ,
EFθ,γ,P [k(U, θ, γ)] if δ?(θ; γ, P ) = δ,
−∞ if δ?(θ; γ, P ) > δ,
where δ? is defined in equation (12). In the implicit-dependence case, define
Kδ(θ; γ, P ) =
[
k(θ, γ)
+∞ ,
, Kδ(θ; γ, P ) =
[
k(θ, γ) if δ?(θ; γ, P ) ≤ δ,
−∞ if δ?(θ; γ, P ) > δ.
24
With this notation, the sample criterion function for the smallest and largest counterfactuals are
Kˆδ(θ) = Kδ(θ; γˆ, Pˆ ) and Kˆδ(θ) = Kδ(θ; γˆ, Pˆ ). We sometimes abbreviate the population criterion
functions to Kδ(θ) := Kδ(θ; γ0, P0) and Kδ(θ) := Kδ(θ; γ0, P0).
Lemma 4.2 Let Assumption Φ hold. Then:
(i) If δ?(θ; γ, P ) > δ, then: there does not exist F ∈ Nδ satisfying conditions (1)–(4) at (θ, γ, P ).
(ii) If Condition S holds at (θ, γ, P ), then: κδ(θ; γ, P ) = Kδ(θ; γ, P ) and κ¯δ(θ; γ, P ) = Kδ(θ; γ, P ).
Lemma 4.2 justifies the description of the inner loop in Section 2. In particular, if Condition S holds
at (θ, γ0, P0) for every θ ∈ Θ with δ?(θ; γ0, P0) ≤ δ, then
κ(Nδ) = inf
θ∈Θ
Kδ(θ) , κ¯(Nδ) = sup
θ∈Θ
Kδ(θ) .
When introducing the estimators κˆ(Nδ) and ˆ¯κ(Nδ) earlier in Section 2, it was argued that the case
δ?(θ; γˆ, Pˆ ) = δ could effectively be ignored because of numerical optimization error. This knife-edge
case can also be ignored at a population level under mild conditions. Equip E with the norm
‖f‖ψ = inf
c>0
1
c
(1 + EF∗ [ψ(c|f(Z)|)]) .
For χ2 and hybrid neighborhoods, the norm ‖ · ‖ψ is equivalent to the L2(F∗) norm. A class of
functions {gα : α ∈ A} ⊂ E is E-continuous in α if ‖gα1 − gα2‖ψ → 0 as α1 → α2 (A is a metric
space). For χ2 and hybrid neighborhoods this notion of continuity is equivalent to L2(F∗) continuity,
i.e., EF∗ [(gα1(U)− gα2(U))2]→ 0 as α1 → α2. Let Θδ = {θ ∈ Θ : δ?(θ, γ0, P0) < δ}.
Assumption M
(i) k(·; θ, γ) and each entry of g(·; θ, γ) are E-continuous in (θ, γ)
(ii) Θδ is nonempty and Condition S holds at (θ, γ0, P0) for each θ ∈ Θδ
(iii) cl(Θδ) ⊇ {θ : δ?(θ; γ0, P0) ≤ δ}.
Assumption M(i) may be verified under continuity conditions on k and g. If k and g each consist of
indicator functions of events, Assumption M(i) holds provided the probabilities of the events under
F∗ are continuous in (θ, γ). In the implicit-dependence case, Assumption M(i) requires that k is
continuous in (θ, γ). We only require E-continuity in θ at γ0 for the results in this subsection; the
results in the next subsection require continuity in (θ, γ). Assumption M(i) reduces to E-continuity
in θ for models with no auxiliary parameter (i.e., no γ). Nonemptyness of Θδ is always satisfied
when the model is correctly specified under F∗, i.e., there exists a θ ∈ Θ solving (1)–(4) under F∗.
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Assumption M(iii) is made for convenience and can be relaxed.9 This condition simply ensures that
there do not exist values of θ at which δ?(θ; γ0, P0) = δ but that are separated from Θδ.
Lemma 4.3 Let Assumptions Φ and M hold. Then:
κ(Nδ) = inf
θ∈Θδ
κ?δ(θ; γ0, P0) , κ¯(Nδ) = sup
θ∈Θδ
κ¯?δ(θ; γ0, P0)
in the explicit-dependence case, and
κ(Nδ) = inf
θ∈Θδ
k(θ; γ0) , κ¯(Nδ) = sup
θ∈Θδ
k(θ; γ0)
in the implicit-dependence case.
Lemma 4.3 is a continuity result. It formally justifies ignoring the knife-edge case δ?(θ; γ0, P0) = δ
when characterizing the extreme counterfactuals at a population level.
4.2 Large-sample properties of plug-in estimators
We now show that the plug-in estimators are consistent and derive their asymptotic distribution.
To do so, we first impose two more mild regularity conditions.
Assumption M (continued)
(iv) Θ is a compact subset of Rdθ
(v) EF∗ [φ?(c1 + c2k(U, θ, γ) + c′3g(U, θ, γ))] is continuous in (θ, γ) for each c ∈ Rd+2.
Assumption M(iv) can be relaxed but simplifies some of the proofs. If k and each entry of g consist
of indicator functions of events, then Assumption M(v) merely requires that the probability of
the events under F∗ are continuous in (θ, γ). For models without auxiliary parameters (i.e. no γ),
Assumption M(v) just requires continuity in θ.
Theorem 4.1 Let Assumptions Φ and M hold and let (γˆ, Pˆ )→p (γ0, P0) or, if there is no auxiliary
parameter, Pˆ →p P0. Then: (κˆ(Nδ), ˆ¯κ(Nδ))′ →p (κ(Nδ), κ¯(Nδ))′.
9This condition can be relaxed by working with sets of the form Nδ′ with δ′ > δ and taking limits of κδ′ and κ¯δ′
as δ′ ↓ δ, since any point with δ?(θ; γ0, P0) = δ belongs to Θδ′ for all δ′ > δ.
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We now derive the asymptotic distribution of the lower and upper bounds. To simplify presentation,
we assume γ is vacuous in the remainder of this subsection. This entails no loss of generality for the
entry game example. For the dynamic discrete choice models it assumes that the Markov transition
matrix is known by the econometrician. We also drop dependence of all quantities on γ for the
remainder of this subsection. We may view the lower and upper bounds as functions of the reduced-
form parameter, so we write κ(Nδ) = κ(Nδ;P0) and κ¯(Nδ) = κ¯(Nδ;P0), and κˆ(Nδ) = κ(Nδ; Pˆ )
and ˆ¯κ(Nδ) = κ¯(Nδ; Pˆ ). Inference results are derived by establishing differentiability properties
of κ(Nδ;P ) and κ¯(Nδ;P ). In some cases, the lower and upper bounds are (fully) differentiable
functions of the reduced-form parameter P and standard delta-method arguments can be applied.
Lack of full differentiability can arise if there are multiple Lagrange multipliers at a particular θ,
and/or if the value of θ at which the lower and/or upper counterfactual is obtained is not unique.
In these cases, the lower and upper bounds satisfy a weaker notion of differentiability and inference
can be performed using subsampling or various modified bootstraps.
Define
Θδ = {θ ∈ Θ : κδ(θ;P ) = κ(Nδ)} , Θδ = {θ ∈ Θ : κ¯δ(θ;P ) = κ¯(Nδ)} .
Also define
Ξδ(θ) = argsupη≥0,ζ∈R,λ∈Λ − EF∗
[
(ηφ)?(−k(U, θ)− ζ − λ′g(U, θ))
]
− ηδ − ζ − (λ′1, λ′2)P ,
Ξδ(θ) = arginfη≥0,ζ∈R,λ∈ΛEF∗
[
(ηφ)?(k(U, θ)− ζ − λ′g(U, θ))
]
+ ηδ + ζ + (λ′1, λ
′
2)P
in the explicit-dependence case, and
Ξδ(θ) = argsupη≥0,ζ∈R,λ∈Λ − EF∗
[
(ηφ)?(−ζ − λ′g(U, θ))
]
− ηδ − ζ − (λ′1, λ′2)P ,
Ξδ(θ) = arginfη≥0,ζ∈R,λ∈ΛEF∗
[
(ηφ)?(−ζ − λ′g(U, θ))
]
+ ηδ + ζ + (λ′1, λ
′
2)P
in the implicit-dependence case. These sets are nonempty, convex and compact under the conditions
of the following Lemma and Theorem. Also let
Λδ(θ) = {(λ′1, λ′2)′ : (η, ζ, λ′1, λ′2, λ′3, λ′4)′ ∈ Ξδ(θ) for some (η, ζ, λ′3, λ′4)′} ,
Λδ(θ) = {(λ′1, λ′2)′ : (η, ζ, λ′1, λ′2, λ′3, λ′4)′ ∈ Ξδ(θ) for some (η, ζ, λ′3, λ′4)′} .
A function f : Rd1+d2 → R is (Hadamard) directionally differentiable at P0 if there is a continuous
map df(P0)[·] : Rd1+d2 → R such that
lim
n→∞
f(P0 + tnpin)− f(P0)
tn
= df(P0)[pi]
for each positive sequence tn ↓ 0 and sequence of vectors pin → pi ∈ Rd1+d2 (Shapiro, 1990, p. 480).
If the map df(P0)[·] is linear then f is (fully) differentiable at P0.
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Lemma 4.4 Let Assumptions Φ and M hold. If Θδ ⊆ Θδ and either (i) Λδ is lower hemicontin-
uous at each θ ∈ Θδ or (ii) Λδ(θ) is a singleton for each θ ∈ Θδ, then: κ(Nδ; ·) is directionally
differentiable at P0:
dκ(Nδ;P0)[pi] = inf
θ∈Θδ
sup
(λ′1,λ
′
2)
′∈Λδ(θ)
−(λ′1, λ′2)′pi .
Similarly, if Θδ ⊆ Θδ, and either (i) Λδ is lower hemicontinuous at each θ ∈ Θδ or (ii) Λδ(θ) is a
singleton for each θ ∈ Θδ then: κ¯(Nδ; ·) is directionally differentiable at P0:
dκ¯(Nδ;P0)[pi] = sup
θ∈Θδ
inf
(λ
′
1,λ
′
2)
′∈Λδ(θ)
(λ
′
1, λ
′
2)pi .
We are now in a position to derive the joint asymptotic distribution of lower and upper bounds.
Provided the first-stage estimator Pˆ is asymptotically normally distributed, the result follows by a
delta method for directionally differentiable functions (Shapiro, 1991) and Lemma 4.4.
Theorem 4.2 Let
√
n(Pˆ − P0)→d N(0,Σ) and let the conditions of Lemma 4.4 hold. Then:
√
n
[
ˆ¯κ(Nδ)− κ¯(Nδ)
κˆ(Nδ)− κ(Nδ)
]
→d
[
supθ∈Θδ inf(λ′1,λ′2)′∈Λδ(θ) (λ
′
1, λ
′
2)Z
infθ∈Θδ sup(λ′1,λ′2)′∈Λδ(θ)−(λ′1, λ′2)Z
]
,
where Z ∼ N(0,Σ).
In particular, if ∪θ∈ΘδΛδ(θ) = {(λ
′
1, λ
′
2)
′} and ∪θ∈ΘδΛδ(θ) = {(λ′1, λ′2)′}, then:
√
n
[
ˆ¯κ(Nδ)− κ¯(Nδ)
κˆ(Nδ)− κ(Nδ)
]
→d N
([
0
0
]
,
[
λ
′
1 λ
′
2
−λ′1 −λ′2
]
Σ
[
λ1 −λ1
λ2 −λ2
])
.
Theorem 4.2 derives the joint asymptotic distribution of plug-in estimators of the extreme counter-
factuals. The asymptotic distribution is typically nonstandard, however, due to directional differ-
entiability of the lower and upper bounds in P . Nevertheless, one may use subsampling or various
modified bootstraps to perform asymptotically valid inference; see Fang and Santos (2019) and
Hong and Li (2018) for related theoretical developments. In particular, note that the directional
derivative dκ(Nδ;P0) is convex when Θδ is a singleton and dκ¯(Nδ;P0) is concave when Θδ is a
singleton. As emphasized in Fang and Santos (2019) and Hong and Li (2018), these convexity and
concavity properties are helpful for guaranteeing uniform asymptotic coverage of one-sided con-
fidence intervals for κ(Nδ) of the form [κˆ(Nδ) − cˆ1−α/
√
n,∞) and one-sided confidence intervals
for κ(Nδ) of the form (−∞, ˆ¯κ(Nδ)− ˆ¯cα/
√
n], where cˆ1−α and ˆ¯cα are critical values obtained using
subsampling or various modified bootstraps.
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5 Sharp bounds on the identified set of counterfactuals
In this section, we show that the extreme counterfactuals κ(Nδ) and κ¯(Nδ) deliver sharp bounds
on the identified set of counterfactuals (i.e., the set of counterfactuals consistent with (1)–(4) where
no parametric distributional assumptions are placed on F ) as the neighborhood size δ becomes
large. In this sense, the local neighborhoods Nδ act like an infinite-dimensional sieve: although they
exclude many distributions, the neighborhoods are in some sense “dense” in the set of distributions
relevant for characterizing the identified set of counterfactuals. We first present results for the
explicit-dependence case, before turning to the implicit-dependence case. Further related theoretical
results are deferred to Appendix B.
5.1 Counterfactuals depending explicitly on latent variables
In the specification of structural models such as dynamic discrete choice models and static and
dynamic games, it is common to assume that the latent variables have a density relative to some
σ-finite dominating measure, say µ (usually Lebesgue measure). In defining the identified set of
counterfactuals, we therefore consider only distributions that are absolutely continuous with respect
to µ. We do so because absolute continuity is often itself a “structural” assumption that is used,
among other things, to help establish existence of equilibria.
To introduce the identified set, let Fθ = {F ∈ F : EF [g(U, θ, γ0)] is finite and F  µ}. The set Fθ
is the largest set of probability measures that are absolutely continuous with respect to µ and for
which the moments (1)–(4) are defined at θ. The identified set of counterfactuals is
K# =
{
EF [k(U, θ, γ0)] such that (1)–(4) hold for some θ ∈ Θ and F ∈ Fθ
}
.
The set Fθ contains many fatter-tailed distributions not in N∞. It therefore seems reasonable to
ask: in confining ourselves to N∞, do we throw away other distributions that can yield smaller
or larger values of the counterfactual? As we shall see, the answer is “no” provided µ and F∗ are
mutually absolutely continuous, which we may interpret as a type of full support condition for
F∗. In that case, the neighborhoods Nδ eventually span the full set of distributions relevant for
characterizing the smallest and largest elements of K#.
We say that k is µ-essentially bounded if |k(·, θ, γ0)| has finite µ-essential supremum10 for each
θ ∈ Θ. This is trivially true if the function k is bounded, i.e.: supu |k(u, θ, γ0)| < ∞ for each θ.
Conditional choice probabilities always satisfy this boundedness condition because the k function is
10The µ-essential supremum of f : U → R is µ-ess sup f = inf{c : µ({u : f(u) > c} = 0)}. Similarly, the µ-essential
infimum is µ-ess inf f = sup{c : µ({u : f(u) < c} = 0)}. Note that inf f ≤ µ-ess inf f ≤ µ-ess sup f ≤ sup f .
29
an indicator function of an event. This boundedness condition ensures the extreme counterfactuals
are finite. Note, however, that we do not require any of the moment functions g1, . . . , g4 to be
bounded.
Theorem 5.1 Let Assumption Φ hold, let Condition S hold at (θ, γ0, P0) for all θ ∈ Θ, let µ and
F∗ be mutually absolutely continuous, and let k be µ-essentially bounded. Then:
κ(Nδ)→ inf K# , κ¯(Nδ)→ supK# as δ →∞.
Remark 5.1 One-sided versions also hold when k is not µ-essentially bounded. Suppose that k
is only µ-essentially bounded from below (i.e. µ-ess inf k(·, θ, γ0) > −∞ for each θ ∈ Θ) and the
remaining conditions of Theorem 5.1 hold. Then: κ(Nδ) → inf K# as δ → ∞. Similarly, if k
is only µ-essentially bounded from above (i.e. µ-ess sup k(·, θ, γ0) < ∞ for each θ ∈ Θ), then:
κ¯(Nδ)→ supK# as δ →∞.
Mutual absolute continuity of µ and F∗ may be interpreted as a type of full support condition on F∗.
In models where µ is Lebesgue measure, it follows from Theorem 5.1 that choosing F∗ with strictly
positive density over U —which is indeed the case for all conventional benchmark choices such as
normal, extreme value (Gumbel), Fre´chet, Pareto, etc.— ensures that the extreme counterfactuals
κ(Nδ) and κ¯(Nδ) will approach the bounds of the identified set of counterfactuals as δ gets large.
5.2 Counterfactuals depending implicitly on latent variables
In the implicit-dependence case, the identified set of counterfactuals is
K# = {k(θ, γ0) such that (1)–(4) hold for some θ ∈ Θ and F ∈ Fθ} .
As k does not depend on U , an analogous version of Theorem 5.1 holds without the essential-
boundedness condition.
Theorem 5.2 Let Assumption Φ hold, let Condition S hold at (θ, γ0, P0) for all θ ∈ Θ, let µ and
F∗ be mutually absolutely continuous. Then:
κ(Nδ)→ inf K# , κ¯(Nδ)→ supK# as δ →∞.
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6 Local sensitivity
Local sensitivity analyses characterize the behavior of a targeted quantity (e.g. a counterfactual
or structural parameter) as a model input (e.g. a distribution or vector of moments) varies over a
vanishingly small neighborhood of an assumed true specification. Here we describe a measure of
local sensitivity of counterfactuals with respect to the distribution of unobservables and connect
the measure to our procedure over small neighborhoods. Our measure deals with an assumption
made at the modeling stage: it holds the observable implications of the model fixed and focuses
on what happens “under the hood” of the model. This is conceptually distinct from the measures
proposed by Andrews, Gentzkow, and Shapiro (2017, 2018; AGS hereafter), which characterize
the sensitivity of estimates of counterfactuals or structural parameters with respect to possible
local misspecification of the moments used in estimation. In their framework, the distribution of
observables is possibly (locally) misspecified. In contrast, our approach holds the observables fixed
and varies specification of the distribution of unobservables. The first part of this section describes
our local sensitivity measure, derives its influence function representation, and presents a consistent
and easily computable estimator. We then show how the influence function we obtain and our local
sensitivity measure is complementary to though conceptually very different from the (statistical)
influence function of the counterfactual and related local sensitivity measures.
Our measure of local sensitivity of counterfactuals with respect to F∗ is
s = lim
δ↓0
(κ¯(Nδ)− κ(Nδ))2
4δ
.
The quantity s measures the curvature of the functions δ 7→ κ(Nδ) and δ 7→ κ¯(Nδ) at δ = 0. If s is
finite, then (under some regularity conditions):
κ(Nδ) = κ(F∗)−
√
δs+ o(
√
δ) , κ¯(Nδ) = κ(F∗) +
√
δs+ o(
√
δ) as δ ↓ 0 ,
where θ(F∗) solves (1)–(4) under F∗ and κ(F∗) = EF∗ [k(U, θ(F∗), γ0)] in the explicit-dependence
case or κ(F∗) = k(θ(F∗), γ0) in the implicit-dependence case.11 When specialized further to point-
identified, regular models studied in the local sensitivity literature, the measure s is particularly
simple to characterize. We present an easily computable estimator sˆ of s in this case, which re-
searchers may report alongside estimated counterfactuals. Approximate bounds on counterfactuals
as F varies over small neighborhoods of F∗ can then be estimated using κˆ ±
√
δsˆ, though the ex-
amples presented in Section 3 indicate that these should be interpreted with some caution outside
of very small neighborhoods.
11Finiteness of s implies that the counterfactual κ(F∗) is point identified. Note that this may be true even if θ(F∗)
is not point identified by the moment conditions (1)–(4); see, e.g., Aguirregabiria (2005), Norets and Tang (2014),
and Kalouptsidi et al. (2017) for the case of dynamic discrete choice models.
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6.1 Counterfactuals depending explicitly on latent variables
To draw further comparison with the local sensitivity literature, we restrict attention to models
with equality restrictions only, i.e., d1 = d3 = 0, and impose some further (standard) GMM-
type regularity conditions. First, assume that the moment conditions (2) and (4) point identify a
structural parameter θ(F∗) ∈ int(Θ) when evaluated under F∗ at (γ0, P20). We write θ(F∗) to make
explicit the dependence of this structural parameter on the assumed specification of F∗. Let
h(u, θ, γ, P2) :=
[
g2(u, θ, γ)− P2
g4(u, θ, γ)
]
and define h0(u) = h(u, θ(F∗), γ0, P20) and k0(u) = k(u, θ(F∗), γ0). We assume EF∗ [h(U, θ, γ0, P20)]
is continuously differentiable with respect to θ at θ(F∗),
H :=
∂
∂θ′
EF∗ [h(U, θ, γ0, P20)]
∣∣∣∣
θ=θ(F∗)
has full rank, V := EF∗ [h0(U)h0(U)′] is finite and positive definite, EF∗ [k(U, θ, γ0)2] is finite,
k(·, θ, γ0) and each entry of h(·, θ, γ0, P20) are L2(F∗) continuous in θ at θ(F∗), and EF∗ [k(U, θ, γ0)]
is continuously differentiable with respect to θ at θ(F∗). Let
J =
∂
∂θ′
EF∗ [k(U, θ, γ0)]
∣∣∣∣
θ=θ(F∗)
.
Define
ι(u) = Πk0(u)− J(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1h0(u) , (18)
where
Πk0(u) = k0(u)− κ(F∗)− EF∗ [k0(U)h0(U)′](V −1 − V −1H(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1)h0(u) .
In just-identified models (i.e. d2 + d4 = dθ), the expression for ι simplifies:
ι(u) = k0(u)− κ(F∗)− JH−1h0(u) .
The function ι is the influence function of the counterfactual with respect to F at F∗. This is
a different notion of influence function from that which is usually encountered when analyzing
semiparametric estimators, as ι measures sensitivity of an estimand to a modeling assumption
rather than sensitivity of an estimator to the data.12 Nevertheless, ι is derived by similar arguments
to those used to in semiparametric efficiency bound calculations for GMM-type models.
12We use the term influence function because the expansion κ(F ) − κ(F∗) =
∫
ι d(F − F∗) + remainder is valid
for distributions F suitably close to F∗, where κ(F ) = EF [k(U, θ(F ), γ0)]. This mimics the usual asymptotic linear
expansion for estimators, where F and F∗ are replaced by the empirical and true probability measures, respectively.
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The following theorem relates local sensitivity to the variance of ι in point-identified, regular mod-
els. We will restrict attention to neighborhoods characterized by χ2 divergence. Other φ-divergences
are locally equivalent to χ2 divergence, so this restriction entails no great loss of generality.13 Neigh-
borhoods constrained by χ2 divergence are also compatible with the above regularity conditions,
which assume k and the entries of g have finite second moments under F∗ (cf. Assumption Φ(ii)).
Theorem 6.1 Let Assumptions Φ(ii) and M(i)(iv) hold for χ2 divergence, and let the above GMM-
type regularity conditions hold. Then: s = 2EF∗ [ι(U)2] where ι is defined in (18).
In this setting, the researcher will have consistent estimates (γˆ, Pˆ2) of (γ0, P20), which can be used
to consistently estimate θ(F∗). Let θˆ denote such an estimator. The researcher would estimate the
counterfactual (under F∗) using
κˆ = EF∗ [k(U, θˆ, γˆ)] .
In addition to the estimated counterfactual κˆ, the researcher could also report an estimate of the
local sensitivity of the counterfactual with respect to F∗:
sˆ = 2EF∗ [(kˆ(U)− κˆ)2] + 2Qˆ′Vˆ Qˆ− 4EF∗ [hˆ(U)(kˆ(U)− κˆ)]′Qˆ ,
where kˆ(u) = k(u, θˆ, γˆ), hˆ(u) = h(u, θˆ, γˆ, Pˆ2), Vˆ = EF∗ [hˆ(U)hˆ(U)′], and
Qˆ = EF∗ [kˆ(U)hˆ(U)′](Vˆ −1 − Vˆ −1Hˆ(Hˆ ′Vˆ −1Hˆ)−1Hˆ ′Vˆ −1) + Jˆ(Hˆ ′Vˆ −1Hˆ)−1Hˆ ′Vˆ −1 ,
with
Hˆ =
∂
∂θ′
EF∗ [h(U, θ, γˆ, Pˆ2)]
∣∣∣∣
θ=θˆ
, Jˆ =
∂
∂θ′
EF∗ [k(U, θ, γˆ)]
∣∣∣∣
θ=θˆ
.
If the model is just identified, then the expression for Qˆ simplifies to Qˆ = JˆHˆ−1. In either case,
the plug-in estimator sˆ is consistent under very mild smoothness conditions.
Lemma 6.1 Let the conditions of Theorem 6.1 hold. Also let (θˆ, γˆ, Pˆ2)→p (θ(F∗), γ0, P20), and let
∂
∂θ′E
F∗ [h(U, θ, γ, P2)],
∂
∂θ′E
F∗ [k(U, θ, γ)], EF∗ [h(U, θ, γ, P2)h(U, θ, γ, P2)′], EF∗ [h(U, θ, γ, P2)k(U, θ, γ)],
EF∗ [h(U, θ, γ, P2)], EF∗ [k(U, θ, γ)], and EF∗ [k(U, θ, γ)2] be continuous in (θ, γ, P2) at (θ(F∗), γ0, P20).
Then: sˆ→p s.
Some of the terms used to construct sˆ will already be computed when estimating the model using
minimum-distance or GMM methods. Therefore, sˆ should be easy to report alongside κˆ in practice.
13See Theorem 4.1 in Csisza´r and Shields (2004). If φ-divergence different from χ2 divergence is used, the quantity
2EF∗ [ι(U)2] may be rescaled by a factor of φ′′(1) to obtain s. No such rescaling is required for KL or hybrid divergence
as φ′′(1) = 1 in both cases.
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6.2 Counterfactuals depending implicitly on latent variables
Turning to the implicit-dependence case, here we make the same GMM-type assumptions on h0,
H, and V , but instead assume that k(θ, γ0) is continuously differentiable with respect to θ at θ(F∗).
The measure of local sensitivity again takes the form s = 2EF∗ [ι(U)2] under the above conditions,
where the influence function is
ι(u) = −J(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1h0(u) (19)
with H, V , and h0 as described in the previous subsection, and J =
∂
∂θ′k(θ, γ0)
∣∣
θ=θ(F∗)
. A result
identical to Theorem 6.1 holds in this setting.
Theorem 6.2 Let Assumptions Φ(ii) and M(i)(iv) hold for φ corresponding to χ2 divergence, and
let the above GMM-type regularity conditions hold. Then: s = 2EF∗ [ι(U)2] where ι is defined in
(19).
In this setting, the researcher will have consistent estimates (θˆ, γˆ, Pˆ2) of (θ(F∗), γ0, P20). The re-
searcher’s estimator of κ(F∗) would be
κˆ = k(θˆ, γˆ) .
The local sensitivity of κ(F∗) with respect to specification of F∗ can be estimated using
sˆ = 2Qˆ′Vˆ Qˆ
where Qˆ = Jˆ(Hˆ ′Vˆ −1Hˆ)−1Hˆ ′Vˆ −1 with Hˆ and Vˆ as described in the previous subsection and Jˆ =
∂
∂θ′k(θ, γˆ)
∣∣
θ=θˆ
. As in the previous subsection, the plug-in estimator sˆ is consistent under very mild
smoothness conditions.
Lemma 6.2 Let the conditions of Theorem 6.2 hold. Also let (θˆ, γˆ, Pˆ2)→p (θ(F∗), γ0, P20), and let
∂
∂θ′E
F∗ [h(U, θ, γ, P2)],
∂
∂θ′k(θ, γ), and E
F∗ [h(U, θ, γ, P2)h(U, θ, γ, P2)
′], be continuous in (θ, γ, P2) at
(θ(F∗), γ0, P20). Then: sˆ→p s.
6.3 Comparison with other notions of sensitivity
We now briefly compare our local sensitivity measure and influence function representation with
the (statistical) influence function of the counterfactual and with AGS’s measures of sensitivity and
informativeness. Consider a class of models whose only moments are of the form (2) with d2 ≥ dθ
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and for which the auxiliary parameter γ is vacuous. Given a first-stage estimator Pˆ2 and assumed
distribution F∗, the researcher could estimate θ by minimizing the criterion function
(EF∗ [g2(U, θ)]− Pˆ2)′Wˆ (EF∗ [g2(U, θ)]− Pˆ2)
given some positive-definite and symmetric matrix Wˆ whose probability limit W is also positive-
definite and symmetric. Assume Pˆ2 is a regular estimator with (statistical) influence function ιP2 ,
i.e.:
√
n(Pˆ2 − P20) = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
ιP2(Xi) + op(1)
where P20 is the probability limit of Pˆ2. The pseudo-true parameter θ(F∗) solves EF∗ [g2(U, θ)] = P20.
Given an estimator θˆ of θ(F∗) obtained using this procedure, the researcher would then estimate
the counterfactual as κˆ = EF∗ [k(U, θˆ)].
By standard delta-method arguments, the (statistical) influence function of κˆ is seen to be
ικ(x) = J
′(H ′WH)−1H ′WιP2(x) , (20)
where H = ∂∂θ′E
F∗ [g2(U, θ)]
∣∣
θ=θ(F∗)
. The function ικ(x) characterizes sensitivity of the estimator κˆ
with respect to perturbations of the data X1, . . . , Xn. This is conceptually very different from the
function ι(u) obtained in the previous subsections, which characterizes sensitivity of the estimand
κ(F∗) with respect to perturbations of F∗.
One may verify that AGS’s measure of sensitivity of κˆ to Pˆ2 is J
′(H ′WH)−1H ′W , the adjustment
required to obtain ικ(x) from ιP2(x). AGS’s measure of informativeness of Pˆ2 for κˆ is 1, meaning
that all (statistical) variation in κˆ is explained by variation in Pˆ2. In contrast, our measure of
sensitivity characterizes “specification variation” in κ as the researcher varies F∗. AGS’s sensitiv-
ity and informativeness measures and our measure of sensitivity therefore represent distinct but
complementary quantities.
7 Conclusion
This paper introduces a framework to study the sensitivity of counterfactuals with respect to
strong parametric assumptions about the distribution of unobservables that are often made in
structural modeling exercises. Using insights from the model uncertainty literature, we show how
to construct the smallest and largest counterfactuals obtained as the distribution of unobservables
varies over fully nonparametric neighborhoods of the researcher’s assumed specification while other
structural features of the model, such as equilibrium conditions, are maintained. We provide a
35
suitable sampling theory for plug-in estimators of the extreme counterfactuals and illustrate our
procedure with applications to two workhorse models. Further, we show that our procedure delivers
sharp bounds on the identified set of counterfactuals as the neighborhoods expand and we explore
connections with a measure of local sensitivity as the neighborhoods shrink. Going forward, we
plan to further extend our methods to accommodate local misspecification in the reduced form and
to consider optimal estimation and inference in this setting.
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A Details for numerical examples
A.1 Discrete game of complete information
This appendix presents closed-form expressions for the programs δ?, κ? and κ¯? and local sensitivity
measure for the game example studied in Section 3.
A.1.1 Objective functions
To develop intuition, we first discuss the case without regressors (i.e. we only use the moment
conditions corresponding to z = 0). Consider the program δ? in display (13). There are nine cell
probabilities associated with different realizations of Uj in the intervals (−∞,−βj ], (βj ,∆−βj ] and
(∆− βj ,∞) for j = 1, 2. We may split the expectation EF∗ [eλ′g(U,θ)] into the probability weighted
sum of conditional expectations over each of the nine cells. Using the moment generating function
(mgf) for the truncated normal distribution, we may deduce
logEF∗
[
eλ
′g(U,θ)
]
=
‖λ4‖2
2
+ log
(
1′
(
(q20(θ, λ4)q
1
0(θ, λ4)
′) ◦R0(λ)
)
1
)
where “◦” denotes element-wise (Hadamard) product, 1 is a conformable vector of ones,
q10(θ, λ4) =
 G(−β1−λ4,1)G(∆−β1−λ4,1)−G(−β1−λ4,1)
G(β1+λ4,1−∆)
 , q20(θ, λ4) =
 G(β2+λ4,2−∆)G(∆−β2−λ4,2)−G(−β2−λ4,2)
G(−β2−λ4,2)
 ,
where G denotes standard normal cumulative distribution function, and
R0(λ) =
 e
−λ1,2 e−λ1,2 e−λ2,2
e−λ1,2 e−λ1,1−λ1,2 e−λ1,1
e−λ2,1 e−λ1,1 e−λ1,1

with λ = (λ′1, λ′2, λ′4)′ where λ1 = (λ1,1, λ1,2)′, λ2 = (λ2,1, λ2,2)′ and λ4 = (λ4,1, λ4,2)′.
Similar computations apply for κ? and κ¯?. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: τ ≤ ∆. We partition the interval for U1 and U2 into four regions: (−∞,−βj ], (−βj , τ−βj ],
(τ −βj ,∆−βj ], (∆−βj ,∞) for j = 1, 2. The counterfactual game is identical to the original game
with βj transformed to βj − τ and ∆ transformed to ∆− τ for j = 1, 2. Thus neither firm enters if
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Uj ≤ τ − βj for j = 1, 2 and both firms enter if Uj ≥ ∆− βj for j = 1, 2. We may then deduce
η logEF∗
[
eη
−1(k(U,θ)+λ′g(U,θ))
]
=
‖λ4‖2
2η
+ η log
(
1′
(
(q2(θ, λ4, η)q
1(θ, λ4, η)
′) ◦R(λ, η))1) (21)
where
q1(θ, λ4, η) =

G(−β1−λ4,1η )
G(τ−β1−λ4,1η )−G(−β1−
λ4,1
η
)
G(∆−β1−λ4,1η )−G(τ−β1−
λ4,1
η
)
G(β1+
λ4,1
η
−∆)
 , q2(θ, λ4, η) =

G(β2+
λ4,2
η
−∆)
G(∆−β2−λ4,2η )−G(τ−β2−
λ4,2
η
)
G(τ−β2−λ4,2η )−G(−β2−
λ4,2
η
)
G(−β2−λ4,2η )
 ,
and
R(λ, η) =

e(1−λ1,2)/η e(1−λ1,2)/η e(1−λ1,2)/η e−λ2,2/η
e(1−λ1,2)/η e(1−λ1,1−λ1,2)/η e(1−λ1,1−λ1,2)/η e(1−λ1,1)/η
e−λ1,2/η e(−λ1,1−λ1,2)/η e(1−λ1,1−λ1,2)/η e(1−λ1,1)/η
e−λ2,1/η e−λ1,1/η e(1−λ1,1)/η e(1−λ1,1)/η
 .
Case 2: τ > ∆. We partition the interval for U1 and U2 into four regions: (−∞,−βj ], (−βj ,∆−βj ],
(∆ − βj , τ − βj ], (τ − βj ,∞) for j = 1, 2. When ∆ − βj < Uj ≤ τ − βj for j = 1, 2 the game has
two equilibria, namely (0, 0) and (1, 1). We do not need to deal with the problem of equilibrium
selection here for the purposes of the counterfactual, however, as neither equilibrium is a monopoly.
The log-mgf term is now computed as in (21), with
q1(θ, λ4, η) =

G(−β1−λ4,1η )
G(∆−β1−λ4,1η )−G(−β1−
λ4,1
η
)
G(τ−β1−λ4,1η )−G(∆−β1−
λ4,1
η
)
G(β1+
λ4,1
η
−τ)
 , q2(θ, λ4, η) =

G(β2+
λ4,2
η
−τ)
G(τ−β2−λ4,2η )−G(∆−β2−
λ4,2
η
)
G(∆−β2−λ4,2η )−G(−β2−
λ4,2
η
)
G(−β2−λ4,2η )
 ,
and
R(λ, η) =

e(1−λ1,2)/η e(1−λ1,2)/η e−λ2,2/η e−λ2,2/η
e−λ1,2/η e−λ1,2/η e−λ2,2/η e−λ2,2/η
e−λ1,2/η e(−λ1,1−λ1,2)/η e−λ1,1/η e(1−λ1,1)/η
e−λ2,1/η e−λ1,1/η e−λ1,1/η e(1−λ1,1)/η
 .
Closed-form expressions for the full case with regressors follow similarly. For each player we first
construct a grid by sorting −βj , ∆−βj , −βj−β, etc, in ascending order. The vectors q1(θ, λ, η) and
q2(θ, λ, η) are then formed similarly to the above case without regressors using the mgf for truncated
normal random variables. The matrix R(λ, η) is also formed similarly, with multipliers λ1,1, . . . , λ1,6
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and λ2,1, . . . , λ2,6 placed in the exponents in cells corresponding to the relevant events in the equality
and inequality restrictions (1) and (2), and with 1 placed in the exponents corresponding to events
in which a monopoly is observed under the policy intervention.
A.1.2 Local sensitivity
Under the parameterization in Section 3, each of the six moment inequalities are slack at (θ0, P0).
Therefore, only the eight moment equalities (six for the model-implied conditional choice probabil-
ities of no entry and duopoly, plus the two mean-zero restrictions) are relevant for characterizing
local sensitivity. In the notation of Section 6, we have
h(u, θ, P2) =

−1l{U1≤−β1;U2≤−β2}+P00,0
−1l{U1≥∆−β1;U2≥∆−β2}+P11,0
−1l{U1≤−β1−β;U2≤−β2−β}+P00,1
−1l{U1≥∆−β1−β;U2≥∆−β2−β}+P11,1
−1l{U1≤−β1−2β;U2≤−β2−2β}+P00,2
−1l{U1≥∆−β1−2β;U2≥∆−β2−2β}+P11,2
U1
U2

,
where P00,z and P11,z denote the conditional probabilities of no entry and duopoly, respectively,
when Z = z. Recall that we normalize β ≡ 1 so θ = (β1, β2,∆)′. Therefore
H =

G′(−β1)G(−β2) G(−β1)G′(−β2) 0
−G′(β1−∆)G(β2−∆) −G(β1−∆)G′(β2−∆)
(
G′(β1−∆)G(β2−∆)
+G(β1−∆)G′(β2−∆)
)
G′(−β1−β)G(−β2−β) G(−β1−β)G′(−β2−β) 0
−G′(β1+β−∆)G(β2+β−∆) −G(β1+β−∆)G′(β2+β−∆)
(
G′(β1+β−∆)G(β2+β−∆)
+G(β1+β−∆)G′(β2+β−∆)
)
G′(−β1−2β)G(−β2−2β) G(−β1−2β)G′(−β2−2β) 0
−G′(β1+2β−∆)G(β2+2β−∆) −G(β1+2β−∆)G′(β2+2β−∆)
(
G′(β1+2β−∆)G(β2+2β−∆)
+G(β1+2β−∆)G′(β2+2β−∆)
)
0 0 0
0 0 0

,
where G′ denotes standard normal probability density function. As ∆ − βj − β ≤ τ − βj − β for
j = 1, 2, here we also have
EF∗ [k(U, θ)] = G(∆− β1 − β)G(β2 + β − τ) +G(β1 + β − τ)G(∆− β2 − β)
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so
J =
 G′(β1+β−τ)G(∆−β2−β)−G′(∆−β1−β)G(β2+β−τ)G(∆−β1−β)G′(β2+β−τ)−G(β1+β−τ)G′(∆−β2−β)
G′(∆−β1−β)G(β2+β−τ)+G(β1+β−τ)G′(∆−β2−β)

′
and:
EF∗ [h0(U)k0(U)] =

κP00,0
κP11,0
κP00,1
κP11,1
κP00,2(
G(β1+β−τ)(G(∆−β2−β)−G(∆−β2−2β))
+G(β2+β−τ)(G(∆−β1−β)−G(∆−β1−2β))
)
+κP11,2
G′(τ−β1−β)G(∆−β2−β)−G′(∆−β1−β)G(β2+β−τ)
G′(τ−β2−β)G(∆−β1−β)−G′(∆−β2−β)G(β1+β−τ)

.
Finally, we partition V conformably:
V =
[
V11 V12
V21 V22
]
,
where V21 = V
′
12, V22 is a 2× 2 identity matrix,
V12 =

G′(−β1)G(−β2) G(−β1)G′(−β2)
−G′(∆−β1)G(β2−∆) −G(β1−∆)G′(∆−β2)
G′(−β1−β)G(−β2−β) G(−β1−β)G′(−β2−β)
−G′(∆−β1−β)G(β2+β−∆) −G(β1+β−∆)G′(∆−β2−β)
G′(−β1−2β)G(−β2−2β) G(−β1−2β)G′(−β2−2β)
−G′(∆−β1−2β)G(β2+2β−∆) −G(β1+2β−∆)G′(∆−β2−2β)

,
and
V11 =

P00,0 0 P00,1
(
(G(−β1)−G(∆−β1−β))
×(G(−β2)−G(∆−β2−β))
)
P00,2
(
(G(−β1)−G(∆−β1−2β))
×(G(−β2)−G(∆−β2−2β))
)
• P11,0 0 P11,0 0 P11,0
• • P00,1 0 P00,2
(
(G(−β1−β)−G(∆−β1−2β))
×(G(−β2−β)−G(∆−β2−2β))
)
• • • P11,1 0 P11,1
• • • • P00,2 0
• • • • • P11,2

− P2P ′2 ,
where “•” denotes corresponding upper-triangular element.
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A.2 Dynamic discrete choice
This appendix contains additional calculations for the local sensitivity measure for the DDC ex-
ample studied in Section 3. In the notation of Section 6, we have
h(u, θ, γ, P2) =

1l
{
pi(1; θpi) + u(1) + βM1v ≥ pi(0; θpi) + u(0) + βM0(v)
}
− P2
max
(
pi(1; θpi) + u(1) + βM1v , pi(0; θpi) + u(0) + βM0v
)
− v
max
(
p˜i(1; θpi) + u(1) + βM˜1v˜ , p˜i(0; θpi) + u(0) + βM˜0v˜
)
− v˜

,
where the indicator function, inequality, and maximum are applied row-wise. We also have
k(u, θ, γ) = 1l
{
p˜i(1; j, θpi) + u(1) + β(M˜1v˜)j ≥ p˜i(0; j, θpi) + u(0) + β(M˜0v˜)j
}
for the CCP of being active in state j, where (Mav˜)j denotes the corresponding entry of Mav˜.
For the Jacobian terms, we may use the i.i.d. type-I extreme value specification to deduce
∂
∂θ′
EF∗ [k(U, θ, γ)] =
e∆p˜i(j,θpi)+β((M˜1−M˜0)v˜)j
(1 + e∆p˜i(j,θpi)+β((M˜1−M˜0)v˜)j )2
[
∂∆p˜i(j,θpi)
∂θ′ 0
′
nx β(M˜1 − M˜0)j
]
,
where θ = (θ′pi, v′, v˜′)′, ∆p˜i(j, θpi) = p˜i(1; j, θpi) − p˜i(0; j, θpi), and (M˜1 − M˜0)j denotes the row of
M˜1 − M˜0 corresponding to state j. Similarly,
∂
∂θ′
EF∗ [h(U, θ, γ, P2)]
=

0 0 0
∂pi(0;θpi)
∂θ′pi
βM0 − I 0
∂p˜i(0;θpi)
∂θ′pi
0 βM˜0 − I
+D

∂∆pi(θpi)
∂θ′pi
β(M1 −M0) 0
∂∆pi(θpi)
∂θ′pi
β(M1 −M0) 0
∂∆p˜i(θpi)
∂θ′pi
0 β(M˜1 − M˜0)
 ,
where ∆pi(θpi) = pi(1; θpi)− pi(0; θpi), 0 denotes a conformable matrix of zeros, and D is a diagonal
matrix, whose diagonal entries are (in order):
e∆pi(x,θpi)+β(M1−M0)v)x
(1 + e∆p˜i(x,θpi)+β((M1−M0)v)x)2
, x = 1, . . . , nx ,
e∆pi(x,θpi)+β((M1−M0)v)x
1 + e∆pi(x,θpi)+β((M1−M0)v)x
, x = 1, . . . , nx , and
e∆p˜i(x,θpi)+β((M˜1−M˜0)v˜)x
1 + e∆p˜i(x,θpi)+β((M˜1−M˜0)v˜)x
, x = 1, . . . , nx .
The remaining matrices Vˆ and EF∗ [kˆ(U)hˆ(U)′] may be computed numerically.
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B Supplementary results on identified sets of counterfactuals
Define
K∞ = {EF [k(U, θ, γ0)] such that (1)–(4) hold for some θ ∈ Θ and F ∈ N∞}
in the explicit-dependence case, and
K∞ = {k(θ, γ0) such that (1)–(4) hold for some θ ∈ Θ and F ∈ N∞}
in the implicit-dependence case. Clearly K∞ ⊆ K# because each Fθ will generally contain fatter-
tailed distributions not inN∞. The set K∞ may not be the quite the identified set of counterfactuals:
there may exist F 6∈ N∞ that are consistent with the model and which yield smaller or larger
values of the counterfactuals. The set K∞ is however relevant as it is eventually spanned by the
counterfactuals over Nδ as δ gets large.
Lemma B.1 Let Assumption Φ hold. Then:
κ(Nδ)→ inf K∞ , κ¯(Nδ)→ supK∞ as δ →∞.
In the explicit-dependence case, the smallest and largest elements of K∞ may be characterized in
terms of low-dimensional convex optimization problems. Define
κ∞(θ; γ, P ) = inf
F∈N∞
EF [k(U, θ, γ)] subject to (1)–(4) holding at (θ, F ) ,
κ¯∞(θ; γ, P ) = sup
F∈N∞
EF [k(U, θ, γ)] subject to (1)–(4) holding at (θ, F ) .
The above programs again have a dual representation as finite-dimensional convex optimization
problems. Let F∗-ess inf and F∗-ess sup denote essential infimum and supremum defined relative to
the measure F∗.
Lemma B.2 Let Assumption Φ hold. Then: the duals of κ∞(θ; γ, P ) and κ¯∞(θ; γ, P ) are
κ?∞(θ; γ, P ) = sup
λ∈Λ:F∗-ess inf(k(·,θ,γ)+λ′g(·,θ,γ))>−∞
(
F∗-ess inf(k(·, θ, γ) + λ′g(·, θ, γ))− λ′12P
)
,
κ¯?∞(θ; γ, P ) = inf
λ∈Λ:F∗-ess sup(k(·,θ,γ)−λ′g(·,θ,γ))<+∞
(
F∗-ess sup(k(·, θ, γ)− λ′g(·, θ, γ)) + λ′12P
)
.
If condition S also holds at (θ, γ, P ), then: strong duality holds: κ∞(θ; γ, P ) = κ?∞(θ; γ, P ) and
κ¯∞(θ; γ, P ) = κ¯?∞(θ; γ, P ).
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Remark B.1 The above programs are non-smooth optimization problems which may be difficult
to solve for certain models. Constraining the set to Nδ with δ < +∞ exerts a sort of smoothing
effect on the optimization problem. For instance, with KL or hybrid divergence the above non-
smooth optimization problem is replaced with the smooth programs (7) and (8), and (9) and (10),
respectively.
We may characterize the smallest and largest elements of K# under a mild constraint qualification
condition. Let ri(A) denote the relative interior of a set A ⊂ Rn (i.e. the interior within the affine
hull of A). If A has positive volume in Rn then ri(A) = int(A).
Condition S# (P
′, 0′d3+d4)
′ ∈ ri({EF [g(U, θ, γ0)] : F ∈ Fθ}+ C).
This condition is weaker than Condition S, as the class of distributions N∞ ⊆ Fθ for each θ. Hence,
if Condition S holds at (θ, γ0, P0) then Condition S# holds there also.
The smallest and largest elements of K# may be computed by solving low-dimensional convex
optimization problems in the explicit-dependence case. Define
κ#(θ; γ0, P0) = inf
F∈Fθ
EF [k(U, θ, γ0)] subject to (1)–(4) holding at (θ, F ) ,
κ¯#(θ; γ0, P0) = sup
F∈Fθ
EF [k(U, θ, γ0)] subject to (1)–(4) holding at (θ, F ) .
These programs also have a dual representation as finite-dimensional convex optimization problems.
Lemma B.3 Let Condition S# hold at (θ, γ0, P0) and let µ-ess sup |k(·, θ, γ0)| < ∞. Then: the
duals of κ#(θ; γ0, P0) and κ¯#(θ; γ0, P0) are
κ?#(θ; γ0, P0) = sup
λ∈Λ:µ-ess inf(k(·,θ,γ0)+λ′g(·,θ,γ0))>−∞
(
µ-ess inf(k(·, θ, γ0) + λ′g(·, θ, γ0))− λ′12P0
)
,
κ¯?#(θ; γ0, P0) = inf
λ∈Λ:µ-ess sup(k(·,θ,γ0)−λ′g(·,θ,γ0))<+∞
(
µ-ess sup(k(·, θ, γ0)− λ′g(·, θ, γ0)) + λ′12P0
)
,
and strong duality holds: κ#(θ; γ0, P0) = κ
?
#(θ; γ0, P0) and κ¯#(θ; γ0, P0) = κ¯
?
#(θ; γ0, P0).
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C Background material on Orlicz spaces
Our results rely on the theory of paired Orlicz spaces. We refer the reader to Krasnosel’skii and
Rutickii (1961) for a textbook treatment. Komunjer and Ragusa (2016) apply similar results to
characterize and study existence of information projections in conditional moment models. Define
L = {f : U → R such that EF∗ [φ(1 + c|f(U)|)] <∞ for some c > 0}
E = {f : U → R such that EF∗ [ψ(c|f(U)|)] <∞ for all c > 0} .
The class L is an Orlicz class of functions corresponding to the function x 7→ φ(1+ |x|) whereas the
class E is the Orlicz heart corresponding to the conjugate function ψ. To summarize the results that
we use, note that the condition limx→∞ xφ′(x)/φ(x) <∞ in Assumption Φ(i) verifies the so-called
∆2-condition in Krasnosel’skii and Rutickii (1961). The space L is a separable Banach space when
equipped with the norm
‖f‖φ = inf
c>0
1
c
(1 + EF∗ [φ(1 + c|f(U)|)]) ,
and the space E is a separable Banach space when equipped with the norm
‖f‖ψ = inf
c>0
1
c
(1 + EF∗ [ψ(c|f(U)|)])
(Krasnosel’skii and Rutickii, 1961, Chapter II, Section 10).
Given two functions φ1, φ2 satisfying Assumption Φ(i), write φ1 ≺ φ2 if there exists positive con-
stants c and x0 such that φ1(x) ≤ φ2(cx) for all x ≥ x0. If φ1 ≺ φ2 and φ2 ≺ φ1 then φ1 and
φ2 are said to be equivalent. Equivalent φ functions induce the same spaces L and E and their
corresponding norms ‖ · ‖φ1 and ‖ · ‖φ2 are equivalent (Krasnosel’skii and Rutickii, 1961, Theorems
13.1 and 13.3). For example, the φ functions inducing hybrid and χ2 divergence are equivalent.
A sequence {fn : n ≥ 1} ⊂ L is E-weakly convergent if {EF∗ [fn(U)g(U)] : n ≥ 1} converges for
each g ∈ E . The space L is E-weakly complete: any E-weakly convergent sequence of functions
{fn : n ≥ 1} ⊂ L has a unique limit, say f∗ ∈ L, for which
lim
n→∞E
F∗ [fn(U)g(U)] = EF∗ [f∗(U)g(U)]
for each g ∈ E ; it is also E-weakly compact: every ‖ · ‖φ-norm bounded sequence in L has an
E-weakly convergent subsequence (Krasnosel’skii and Rutickii, 1961, Theorem 14.4). A version of
Ho¨lder’s inequality also holds:
|EF∗ [f(U)g(U)]| ≤ ‖f‖φ‖g‖ψ
for each f ∈ L and g ∈ E (Krasnosel’skii and Rutickii, 1961, Theorem 9.3).
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D Proof of main results
We start with some preliminary Lemmas. Let L+ := {m ∈ L : m ≥ 0 (F∗-almost everywhere)}.
Lemma D.1 Let Assumption Φ hold. Then: EF∗ [φ(m(U))] <∞ if and only if m ∈ L+.
Proof of Lemma D.1. To prove EF∗ [φ(m(U))] < ∞ implies m ∈ L+, first note that we must
have m ≥ 0 (F∗-almost everywhere) because φ(x) = +∞ if x < 0. Taking c = 12 in the definition of
‖ · ‖φ, we obtain ‖m‖φ ≤ 2 + φ(2) + EF∗ [φ(m(U))] <∞.
To provem ∈ L+ implies EF∗ [φ(m(U))] <∞, first note that the condition limx→∞ xφ′(x)/φ(x) <∞
in Assumption Φ(i) verifies the so-called ∆2-condition. Thus, m ∈ L implies EF∗ [φ(1 + c|m(U)|)] <
∞ for all c > 0. As F∗ is a finite measure, L also contains constant functions. As L is closed under
addition, we therefore have
∞ > EF∗ [φ(1 + |m(U)− 1|)] = EF∗ [φ(m(U))1l{m(U) ≥ 1}] + EF∗ [φ(2−m(U))1l{m(U) ≤ 1}]
which implies EF∗ [φ(m(U))1l{m(U) ≥ 1}] is finite. Finiteness of EF∗ [φ(m(U))1l{m(U) ≤ 1}] follows
because ∞ > φ(0) ≥ φ(x) ≥ φ(1) = 0 for x ∈ [0, 1] under Assumption Φ.
We identify each F ∈ Nδ with its Radon–Nikodym derivative with respect to F∗. LetMδ denote the
set of all measurable m : U → R for which EF∗ [φ(m(U))] ≤ δ. Note thatMδ is a ‖·‖φ-norm bounded
subset of L by the proof of Lemma D.1. Therefore, |EF [k(U, θ, γ)]| ≤ ‖k(·, θ, γ)‖ψ‖m‖φ holds for any
F ∈ Nδ by a version of Ho¨lder’s inequality for Orlicz classes. Finiteness of |EF [k(U, θ, γ)]| follows
by Assumption Φ(ii) whenever F ∈ Nδ.
In each of the following proofs, we only prove the results for the lower value κ. The result for the
upper value κ¯ follows by parallel arguments.
In view of Lemma D.1, an equivalent formulation of κδ(θ; γ, P ) is
κδ(θ; γ, P ) = inf
m∈Mδ
EF∗ [m(U)k(U, θ, γ)] subject to EF∗ [m(U)] = 1 , (22)
EF∗ [m(U)g1(U, θ, γ)] ≤ P1 ,
EF∗ [m(U)g2(U, θ, γ)] = P2 ,
EF∗ [m(U)g3(U, θ, γ)] ≤ 0 ,
EF∗ [m(U)g4(U, θ, γ)] = 0 ,
where κδ(θ; γ, P ) = +∞ if infimum runs over an empty set. Similarly, an equivalent formulation of
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the program
I(θ; γ, P ) := inf
F
Dφ(F‖F∗) subject to (1)–(4) holding under F at (θ, γ, P )
is
inf
m∈L+
EF∗ [φ(m(U))] subject to the moment conditions in (22) . (23)
We verify a Slater constraint qualification condition for the programs I(θ; γ, P ) and κδ(θ; γ, P ) and
κ¯δ(θ; γ, P ). The condition corresponds to display (2.312) in Bonnans and Shapiro (2000).
Lemma D.2 Let Assumption Φ hold and let Condition S hold at (θ, γ, P ). Then:
(1, P ′, 0′d3+d4)
′ ∈ int({EF∗ [m(U)(1, g(U, θ, γ)′)′] : m ∈ L+}+ {0} × C) ,
which is the constraint qualification for I(θ; γ, P ). If I(θ; γ, P ) < δ also holds, then:
(δ, 1, P ′, 0′d3+d4)
′ ∈ int({(EF∗ [φ(m(U))],EF∗ [m(U)(1, g(U, θ, γ)′)])′ : m ∈ L+}+ R+ × {0} × C) ,
which is the constraint qualification for κδ(θ; γ, P ) and κ¯δ(θ; γ, P ).
Proof of Lemma D.2. As condition S holds at (θ, γ, P ), we have (applying integration element-
wise)
(P ′, 0′d3+d4)
′ ∈ int
({∫
g(u, θ, γ) dF (u) : F ∈ N∞
}
+ C
)
.
For each t > 0, let tNδ = {tF : F ∈ Nδ}. We then have
(1, P ′, 0′d3+d4)
′ ∈ int
({∫
(1, g(u, θ, γ)′)′ dG(u) : G ∈ ∪t∈[ 1
2
, 3
2
]tNδ
}
+ {0} × C
)
⊆ int({EF∗ [m(U)(1, g(U, θ, γ)′)′] : m ∈ L+}+ {0} × C) , (24)
where the second inclusion is by Lemma D.1 and the fact that L is a linear space (so m ∈ L+
implies tm ∈ L+ for all t ≥ 0). This verifies the constraint qualification for I(θ; γ, P ).
Now, if δ?(θ; γ, P ) < δ then mθ,γ,P is feasible for (22) and EF∗ [φ(mθ,γ,P (U))] < δ. By the inclusion
(24), we have
(δ, 1, P ′, 0′d3+d4)
′ ∈ int({(EF∗ [φ(m˜(U))],EF∗ [m˜(U)(1, g(U, θ, γ)′)])′ :
m˜ = tmθ,γ,P + (1− t)m,m ∈ L+, t ∈ [0, 1]}+ R+ × {0} × C)
⊆ int({(EF∗ [φ(m(U))],EF∗ [m(U)(1, g(U, θ, γ)′)])′ : m ∈ L+}+ R+ × 0× C) .
This verifies the constraint qualification for κδ(θ; γ, P ) and κ¯δ(θ; γ, P ).
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Proof of Lemma 4.1. The proof extends arguments from Section 3.2 of Shapiro (2017) to deal
with (i) the equalities/inequalities in (1)–(4) representing the equilibrium conditions of the model,
(ii) the function class L, and (iii) additional issues that arise at η = 0.
Using the equivalent formulation in display (22), the Lagrangian for κδ(θ; γ, P ) is
L(m, η, ζ, λ) = EF∗ [m(U)(k(U, θ, γ) + ζ + λ′g(U, θ, γ)) + ηφ(m(U))]− ηδ − ζ − λ′12P ,
where m ∈ L+, η ∈ R+, ζ ∈ R, and λ ∈ Λ. The Lagrangian dual problem is therefore κ?δ(θ; γ, P ) =
supη≥0,ζ∈R,λ∈Λ infm∈L+ L(m, η, ζ, λ). As L is decomposable (Rockafellar and Wets, 1998, Definition
14.59 and Theorem 14.60), we may bring the infimum inside the expectation to obtain
inf
m∈L+
L(m, η, ζ, λ) = EF∗
[
inf
x≥0
x(k(U, θ, γ) + ζ + λ′g(U, θ, γ)) + ηφ(x)
]
− ηδ − ζ − λ′12P
= −EF∗
[
sup
x≥0
x(−k(U, θ, γ)− ζ − λ′g(U, θ, γ))− ηφ(x)
]
− ηδ − ζ − λ′12P
= −EF∗
[
(ηφ)?(−k(U, θ, γ)− ζ − λ′g(U, θ, γ))
]
− ηδ − ζ − λ′12P .
The dual formulation in display (5) now follows.
When Condition S holds and δ?(θ; γ, P ) < δ, it follows by Lemma D.2 and Theorem 2.165 of
Bonnans and Shapiro (2000) that the set of solutions to the dual program is a nonempty, convex,
compact subset of R+ ×R×Λ. Suppose that the solution is attained at (0, ζ∗, λ∗) for some ζ∗ ∈ R
and λ ∈ Λ∗. Let `(η, ζ, λ) = infm∈L+ L(m, η, ζ, λ). As ` is the pointwise infimum of affine functions,
it is concave and upper-semicontinuous. By upper-semicontinuity, we have
`(0, ζ∗, λ∗) ≥ lim sup
η↓0
`(η, ζ∗, λ∗) .
Note the value `(0, ζ∗, λ∗) is necessarily finite: there is no duality gap (by Condition S) and the
value of the primal problem is bounded (by Assumption Φ). On the other hand, for any τ ∈ (0, 1),
by concavity:
`(τη, ζ∗, λ∗) ≥ τ`(η, ζ∗, λ∗) + (1− τ)`(0, ζ∗, λ∗) .
Taking lim infη↓0 of both sides and rearranging, we obtain
lim inf
η↓0
`(η, ζ∗, λ∗) ≥ `(0, ζ∗, λ∗) ,
hence limη↓0 `(η, ζ∗, λ∗) = `(0, ζ∗, λ∗). We therefore have
`(0, ζ∗, λ∗) = sup
η≥0,ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
`(η, ζ, λ) ≥ sup
η>0,ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
`(η, ζ, λ) ≥ lim
η↓0
`(η, ζ∗, λ∗) = `(0, ζ∗, λ∗) .
Therefore, it is without loss of generality to take the supremum over (0,∞)× R× Λ.
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For KL divergence, φ?(x) = ex − 1 so (ηφ)?(x) = ηeη−1x − η for η > 0. Therefore, for any η > 0
inf
m∈L+
L(m, η, ζ, λ) = −ηEF∗
[
e−η
−1(k(U,θ,γ)+ζ+λ′g(U,θ,γ))
]
+ η − ηδ − ζ − λ′12P .
Optimizing with respect to ζ gives
sup
ζ∈R
inf
m∈L+
L(m, η, ζ, λ) = −η logEF∗
[
e−η
−1(k(U,θ,γ)+λ′g(U,θ,γ))
]
− ηδ − λ′12P .
For hybrid divergence, we have φ?(x) = Ψ(x) where Ψ(x) is defined in equation (11). Therefore,
for any η > 0
inf
m∈L+
L(m, η, ζ, λ) = −ηEF∗
[
Ψ
(
− η−1(k(U, θ, γ) + ζ + λ′g(U, θ, γ)))]− ηδ − ζ − λ′12P
as claimed.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Using the equivalent formulation of I(θ; δ, P ) in display (23), the La-
grangian for I(θ; γ, P ) is L(m, ζ, λ) = EF∗ [m(U)(−ζ − λ′g(U, θ, γ)) + φ(m(U))] − ζ − λ′12P . It
follows by similar arguments to Lemma 4.1 that
inf
m∈L+
L(m, ζ, λ) = −EF∗
[
φ?(ζ + λ′g(U, θ, γ))
]
− ζ − λ′12P ,
hence
δ?(θ; γ, P ) = sup
ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
−EF∗
[
φ?(−ζ − λ′g(U, θ, γ))
]
− ζ − λ′12P
as in display (12). For KL divergence, we have
δ?(θ; γ, P ) = sup
ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
−EF∗
[
e−ζ−λ
′g(U,θ,γ)
]
+ 1− ζ − λ′12P
= sup
λ∈Λ
− logEF∗
[
e−λ
′g(U,θ,γ)
]
− λ′12P .
Similarly, for hybrid divergence, we have
δ?(θ; γ, P ) = sup
ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
−EF∗ [Ψ (−ζ − λ′g(U, θ, γ))]− ζ − λ′12P .
Part (i): By weak duality, we have I(θ; γ, P ) ≥ δ?(θ; γ, P ). Therefore, δ?(θ; γ, P ) > δ implies there is
no solution F ∈ Nδ satisfying (1)–(4) at (θ, γ, P ), so we set κδ(θ; γ, P ) = +∞ and κ¯δ(θ; γ, P ) = −∞.
Part (ii): By the first part of Lemma D.2, strong duality holds for I(θ; γ, P ) so I(θ; γ, P ) =
δ?(θ; γ, P ). First consider the explicit-dependence case. If δ?(θ; γ, P ) = δ then mθ,γ,P is the unique
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m ∈ Mδ that satisfies the constraints in (22). Thus, both lower and upper values of the coun-
terfactuals are attained under Fθ,γ,P . If, in addition, δ
?(θ; γ, P ) < δ then strong duality holds for
κδ(θ; γ, P ) and κ¯δ(θ; γ, P ) (Bonnans and Shapiro, 2000, Theorem 2.165).
In the implicit-dependence case, if δ?(θ; γ, P ) ≤ δ then there exists a distribution F ∈ Nδ satisfying
the constraints (1)–(4) at (θ, γ, P ), so the counterfactual is k(θ, γ).
Proof of Lemma 4.3. First consider the explicit-dependence case. By Lemma 4.2(ii), we have
that infθ∈Θδ κδ(θ; γ0, P0) = infθ∈Θδ κ
?
δ(θ; γ0, P0) under Assumption Φ and Assumption M(ii). As
infθ∈Θδ κδ(θ; γ0, P0) ≥ infθ∈Θ κδ(θ; γ0, P0) =: κ(Nδ), it therefore remains to show
inf
θ∈Θδ
κδ(θ; γ0, P0) ≤ inf
θ∈Θ
κδ(θ; γ0, P0) .
We prove this inequality by contradiction. Suppose there exists θ∗ 6∈ Θδ with κδ(θ∗; γ0, P0) <
infθ∈Θδ κδ(θ; γ0, P0). As κδ(θ
∗; γ0, P0) < +∞, there must exist some m ∈ Mδ satisfying the con-
straints in (22) at (θ∗, γ0, P0). But as δ?(θ∗; γ0, P0) = δ, it follows by convexity of φ that mθ∗,γ0,P0
must be the unique such m ∈Mδ. Therefore
κδ(θ
∗; γ0, P0) = EF∗ [mθ∗,γ0,P0(U)k(U, θ
∗, γ0)]
< inf
θ∈Θδ
κδ(θ; γ0, P0)
≤ inf
θ∈Θδ
EF∗ [mθ,γ0,P0(U)k(U, θ0, γ0)] . (25)
By Assumption M(iii), we must have θ∗ ∈ cl(Θδ). Take a sequence {θn : n ≥ 1} ⊂ Θδ with θn → θ∗.
As {mθn,γ0,P0 : n ≥ 1} ⊂ Mδ, it is ‖ · ‖φ-norm bounded and hence has an E-weakly convergent
subsequence (Krasnosel’skii and Rutickii, 1961, Theorem 14.4). That is, there exists a subsequence
{θni : i ≥ 1} and a unique m∗ ∈ L such that mθni ,γ0,P0 is E-weakly convergent to m∗. By the
triangle inequality and Ho¨lder’s inequality, we may deduce∣∣∣EF∗ [mθni ,γ0,P0(U)k(U, θni , γ0)]− EF∗ [m∗(U)k(U, θ∗, γ0)]∣∣∣
≤ |EF∗ [(mθni ,γ0,P0(U)−m∗(U))k(U, θ∗, γ0)]|+ ‖m∗‖φ‖k( · , θni , γ0)− k( · , θ∗, γ0)‖ψ ,
where the first term on the right-hand side vanishes by E-weak convergence and the second term
vanishes by Assumption M(i) and Ho¨lder’s inequality for Orlicz classes. By similar arguments, we
may deduce
EF∗ [m∗(U)] = 1 , EF∗ [m∗(U)g1(U, θ∗, γ0)] ≤ P10 , EF∗ [m∗(U)g2(U, θ∗, γ0)] = P20 ,
EF∗ [m∗(U)g3(U, θ∗, γ0)] ≤ 0 , EF∗ [m∗(U)g4(U, θ∗, γ0)] = 0 .
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Therefore, m∗ satisfies all the constraints in (22) at (θ∗, γ0, P0). Finally, as m 7→ EF∗ [φ(m)] is
lower semicontinuous in the E-weak topology on L (Komunjer and Ragusa, 2016, p. 961), we have
δ ≥ lim infi→∞ EF∗ [φ(mθni ,γ0,P0(U))] ≥ EF∗ [φ(m∗(U))] hence m∗ ∈Mδ.
To complete the proof, note that Lemma 4.2 and strict convexity of φ implies m∗ = mθ∗,γ0,P0 , hence
inf
θ∈Θδ
EF∗ [mθ,γ,P (U)k(U, θ, γ0)] ≤ lim
i→∞
EF∗ [mθni ,γ0,P0(U)k(U, θni , γ0)]
= EF∗ [mθ∗,γ0,P0(U)k(U, θ
∗, γ0)] ,
which contradicts (25).
In the implicit-dependence case, E-continuity of k(θ, γ) is equivalent to continuity of the function
(θ, γ) 7→ k(θ, γ). Then infθ∈Θδ k(θ, γ0) = infθ∈cl(Θδ) k(θ, γ0) ≤ infθ:δ?(θ;γ0,P0)≤δ k(θ, γ0) by Assump-
tion M(iii), and infθ:δ?(θ;γ0,P0)≤δ k(θ, γ0) ≤ infθ∈Θδ k(θ, γ0).
Proof of Theorem 4.1. This follows immediately from Lemmas E.4 and E.5 and Slutsky’s
theorem.
Lemma 4.4 is proved by extending some arguments from Shapiro (2008) to allow for non-compactness
of the domain and possibly discontinuous objective function. These extensions are important be-
cause the multipliers take values in R+ × R × Λ, which is not compact, and discontinuity of the
objective may arise along the boundary where η = 0. Some of our extensions use techniques from
Pollard (1991) on asymptotics for minimizers of convex stochastic processes.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. We first prove the result for the explicit-dependence case. Write Ξδ =
Ξδ(θ;P0) and Λδ = Λδ(θ;P0) to denote dependence of the sets of multipliers on P . In view of
Lemmas E.1, E.3 and E.6, the sets Ξδ(θ;P ) and Λδ(θ;P ) are nonempty, convex and compact for
all P in a neighborhood of P0. Let Pn = P0 + tnpin. We first prove the inequality
lim sup
n→∞
κ(Nδ;Pn)− κ(Nδ;P0)
tn
≤ inf
θ∈Θδ
sup
(λ′1,λ
′
2)∈Λδ(θ)
−(λ′1, λ′2)pi . (26)
Take any θ ∈ Θδ. Condition S holds at (θ, P0) by Assumption M(ii) and hence also at (θ, Pn) for
all n sufficiently large by Lemma E.1. It follows that for n sufficiently large we have
κδ(θ;P0) = κ
?
δ(θ;P0) , κδ(θ;Pn) = κ
?
δ(θ;Pn) (27)
in which case, for any (λ′1n, λ′2n) ∈ Λδ(θ;Pn), the inequality
κ?δ(θ;P0) ≥ κ?δ(θ;Pn)− (λ′1n, λ′2n)(P0 − Pn) (28)
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must hold. By (27) and (28), for n sufficiently large we must have
κ(Nδ;P0) = κ?δ(θ;P0) ≥ κ?δ(θ;Pn)− (λ′1n, λ′2n)(P0 − Pn) ≥ κ(Nδ;Pn)− (λ′1n, λ′2n)(P0 − Pn)
hence κ(Nδ;Pn) − κ(Nδ;P0) ≤ −(λ′1n, λ′2n)(Pn − P0). As d((λ′1n, λ′2n),Λδ(θ;P0)) → 0 (cf. Lemma
E.8) and Λδ(θ;P0) is bounded, we obtain the inequality
lim sup
n→∞
κ(Nδ;Pn)− κ(Nδ;P0)
tn
≤ sup
(λ′1,λ
′
2)∈Λδ(θ)
−(λ′1, λ′2)pi .
As θ ∈ Θδ(P ) was arbitrary, this proves (26).
We now establish the corresponding lower bound
lim inf
n→∞
κ(Nδ;Pn)− κ(Nδ;P0)
tn
≥ inf
θ∈Θδ
sup
(λ′1,λ
′
2)∈Λδ(θ)
−(λ′1, λ′2)pi . (29)
Choose a sequence {θn : n ≥ 1} ⊂ Θ such that κδ(θn;Pn) ≤ κ(Nδ;Pn) + o(tn). By Assumption
M(iv) (passing to a subsequence if necessary) we may assume that θn converges to some θ
∗ ∈ Θ.
We first show that θ∗ ∈ Θδ. For each n, choose mn solving the primal problem for κδ(θn;Pn). As
{mn : n ≥ 1} ⊂ Mδ, it has an E-weakly convergent subsequence {mni : i ≥ 1} with mni → m∗ ∈ L.
By similar arguments to the proof of Lemma 4.3, we may deduce that m∗ ∈ Mδ, the constraints
in (22) are all satisfied by m∗ at (θ∗, P0), and EF∗ [mni(U)k(U, θni)] → EF∗ [m∗(U)k(U, θ∗)]. By
definition of θn,
κ(Nδ;Pni) ≤ EF∗ [mni(U)k(U, θni)] ≤ κ(Nδ;Pni) + o(tni) .
Lemma E.4 implies κ(Nδ;Pni)→ κ(Nδ;P0), hence EF∗ [m∗(U)k(U, θ∗)] = κ(Nδ;P0) and so θ∗ ∈ Θδ.
Returning to the proof of (29), note Condition S holds at (θ∗, P0) by Assumption M(ii). Therefore,
Condition S also holds at (θn, P0) and (θn, Pn) for all n sufficiently large (cf. Lemma E.2), and we
obtain
κδ(θn;P0) = κ
?
δ(θn;P0) , κδ(θn;Pn) = κ
?
δ(θn;Pn) .
By similar arguments to the proof of the upper bound, we deduce that for all n sufficiently large:
κ(Nδ;Pn) ≥ κ?δ(θn;Pn)− o(tn)
≥ κ?δ(θn;P0)− (λ′1n, λ′2n)(Pn − P0)− o(tn)
≥ κ(Nδ;P0)− (λ′1n, λ′2n)(Pn − P0)− o(tn)
for any (λ′1n, λ′2n) ∈ Λδ(θn;P0). If Λδ(·;P0) is lower hemicontinuous at θ∗, then we may choose
(λ′1n, λ′2n) ∈ Λδ(θn;P0) so that (λ′1n, λ′2n) → (λ′1, λ′2) ∈ arg sup(λ′1,λ′2)∈Λδ(θ∗;P0)(λ′1, λ′2)pi. Otherwise,
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if Λδ(·;P0) is a singleton then convergence follows by Lemma E.8. Therefore
lim inf
n→∞
κ(Nδ;Pn)− κ(Nδ;P0)
tn
≥ −(λ′1, λ′2)′pi
= sup
(λ′1,λ
′
2)∈Λδ(θ∗)
−(λ′1, λ′2)pi
≥ inf
θ∈Θδ
sup
(λ′1,λ
′
2)∈Λδ(θ)
−(λ′1, λ′2)′pi
which completes the proof for the explicit-dependence case.
The result for the implicit-dependence case follows similarly. An equivalent primal problem in this
case is described in equation (41) and its dual is in equation (42), which is why the set of multipliers
Ξδ is defined differently in this case. If Condition S holds at (θ, P ) and δ
?(θ;P ) < δ then strong
duality holds, i.e.: κ?δ(θ;P ) = k(θ) (cf. Lemma D.2).
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The result follows directly from Theorem 2.1 of Shapiro (1991), using
Lemma 4.4 and the condition
√
n(Pˆ − P )→d N(0,Σ).
Recall Condition S# and the programs κ#, κ¯#, κ∞, and κ¯∞ from Appendix B.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. As condition S holds at (θ, γ0, P0) for each θ ∈ Θ, condition S# must
also hold there. So by Lemma B.3, we obtain
κ#(θ; γ0, P0) = sup
λ∈Λ:µ-ess inf(k(·,θ,γ0)+λ′g(·,θ,γ0))>−∞
(
µ-ess inf(k(·, θ, γ0) + λ′g(·, θ, γ0))− λ′12P0
)
,
κ¯#(θ; γ0, P0) = inf
λ∈Λ:µ-ess sup(k(·,θ,γ0)−λ′g(·,θ,γ0))<+∞
(
µ-ess sup(k(·, θ, γ0)− λ′g(·, θ, γ0)) + λ′12P0
)
for each θ ∈ Θ. But by Lemma B.2 and the fact that Condition S holds at (θ, γ0, P0) for each θ ∈ Θ,
we also have
κ∞(θ; γ0, P0) = sup
λ∈Λ:F∗-ess inf(k(·,θ,γ0)+λ′g(·,θ,γ0))>−∞
(
F∗-ess inf(k(·, θ, γ0) + λ′g(·, θ, γ0))− λ′12P0
)
,
κ¯∞(θ; γ0, P0) = inf
λ∈Λ:F∗-ess sup(k(·,θ,γ0)−λ′g(·,θ,γ0))<+∞
(
F∗-ess sup(k(·, θ, γ0)− λ′g(·, θ, γ0)) + λ′12P0
)
for each θ ∈ Θ. As µ and F∗ are mutually absolutely continuous, the µ-essential supremum and F∗-
essential supremum are equal, and the same is true for essential infimum. Therefore, κ#(θ; γ0, P0) =
κ∞(θ; γ0, P0) and κ¯#(θ; γ0, P0) = κ¯∞(θ; γ0, P0) for each θ ∈ Θ, so inf K# = inf K∞ and supK# =
supK∞. The result now follows by Lemma B.1.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. By Lemma B.1 and the fact that K# ⊇ K∞, it’s enough to show that
inf K# ≥ inf K∞ and supK# ≤ supK∞.
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First, suppose that inf K# > −∞. Then for any ε > 0 there exists θε ∈ Θ and Fε ∈ Fθ such that
conditions (1)–(4) hold at (θε, Fε) and for which k(θε, γ0) < inf K# + ε. As condition S holds at
(θε, γ0, P0), condition S# must also hold there. As θε is feasible, by Lemma E.10 we must have
0 = sup
λ∈Λ:µ-ess inf(λ′g(·,θ,γ0))>−∞
(
µ-ess inf(λ′g(·, θ, γ0))− λ′12P0
)
.
As µ and F∗ are mutually absolutely continuous, the µ-essential supremum and F∗-essential supre-
mum are equal, and the same is true for essential infimum. Therefore
0 = sup
λ∈Λ:F∗-ess inf(λ′g(·,θ,γ0))>−∞
(
F∗-ess inf(λ′g(·, θ, γ0))− λ′12P0
)
.
It follows by Lemma E.9 that there exists F ∈ N∞ such that (1)–(4) hold at (θε, F ). Therefore,
inf K∞ ≤ k(θε, γ0) < inf K# + ε.
Now suppose that inf K# = −∞. Then for any n ∈ N there exists θn ∈ Θ and Fn ∈ Fθ such that
conditions (1)–(4) hold at (θn, Fn) and for which k(θn, γ0) ≤ −n. A similar argument shows that
there exists F ∈ N∞ such that (1)–(4) hold at (θn, F ). Therefore, inf K∞ ≤ k(θn, γ0) ≤ −n.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. To simplify notation, we drop dependence of h on (γ, P2) and k on γ
throughout the proof.
Take any function b ∈ L2(F∗) with EF∗ [b(U)] = 0. By analogy with standard efficiency bound
calculations for GMM, define the projection Π : L2(F∗)→ L2(F∗) by
Πb = b− EF∗ [b(U)h0(U)′](V −1 − V −1H(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1)h0 .
If the model is just-identified, then (V −1 − V −1H(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1) = 0 and the projection
reduces to the identity map.
Using a standard construction (cf. Example 3.2.1 in Bickel, Klaassen, Ritov, and Wellner (1993)),
for each t ∈ (−1, 1) we define a probability measure Ft via
dFt
dF∗
=
υ(tΠb)
EF∗ [υ(tΠb(U))]
, where υ(x) =
2
1 + e−2x
.
Thus {Ft : t ∈ (−1, 1)} is a smooth parametric family passing through F∗ at t = 0. Fix any
dθ × (d2 + d4) matrix A of full rank. Premultiplying h by A yields a just-identified system with
moment functions Ah(u, θ). By the implicit function theorem and invertibility of AH, there exists
ε > 0 such that the moment condition EFt [Ah(U, θ)] = 0 has a unique solution θ(Ft) ∈ Θ for all
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t ∈ (−ε, ε), and
dθ(Ft)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= −(AH)−1AEF∗ [h0(U)Πb(U)] .
Writing κ(Ft) = EFt [k(U, θ(Ft))], we therefore have
dκ(Ft)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= EF∗ [k0(U)Πb(U)]− J(AH)−1AEF∗ [h0(U)Πb(U)]
= EF∗ [ι˜(U)Πb(U)] ,
where ι˜(u) = k0(u)− κ(F∗)− J(AH)−1Ah0(u). As Π is an orthogonal projection:
dκ(Ft)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= EF∗ [Πι˜(U)Πb(U)] .
However, note that irrespective of the choice of A, we have
Πι˜ = Πk0 − J(AH)−1A(h0 − EF∗ [h0(U)h0(U)′](V −1 − V −1H(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1)h0)
= Πk0 − J(AH)−1A(h0 − V (V −1 − V −1H(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1)h0)
= Πk0 − J(AH)−1AH(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1h0
= Πk0 − J(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1h0
= ι
hence
dκ(Ft)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= EF∗ [ι(U)Πb(U)]
for all b ∈ L2(F∗).
As φ(x) = x
2−1−2(x−1)
2 , a Taylor series expansion of υ(x) around x = 0 yields
Dφ(Ft‖F∗) = t
2
2
EF∗ [(Πb(U))2] + o(t2) .
Therefore, whenever Πb 6= 0 we have
(κ(Ft)− κ(F−t))2
4Dφ(Ft‖F∗) =
EF∗ [ι(U)Πb(U)]2 + o(1)
1
2EF∗ [(Πb(U))2] + o(1)
hence
s ≥ E
F∗ [ι(U)Πb(U)]2
1
2EF∗ [(Πb(U))2]
.
If ι(u) = 0 (F∗-almost everywhere) then the right-hand side is zero for any b and we trivially have
s ≥ 2EF∗ [ι(U)2]. Otherwise, choosing b = ι yields s ≥ 2EF∗ [ι(U)2].
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We prove the reverse inequality s ≤ 2EF∗ [ι(U)2] by contradiction. Suppose that there exists a
sequence δn ↓ 0 and ε > 0 such that
(κ¯(Nδn)− κ(Nδn))2
4δn
≥ 2EF∗ [ι(U)2] + 2ε
for each n. We may choose mn,mn ∈Mδn and θn, θn ∈ Θ such that
EF∗ [mn(U)] = 1 , EF∗ [mn(U)] = 1 , EF∗ [mn(U)h(U, θn)] = 0 , EF∗ [mn(U)h(U, θn)] = 0
and
(EF∗ [mn(U)k(U, θn)−mn(U)k(U, θn)])2
4δn
≥ 2EF∗ [ι(U)2] + ε . (30)
By Assumption M(iv) (taking a subsequence if necessary), we can assume that θn → θ∗ and θn → θ∗
for some θ∗, θ∗ ∈ Θ.
As neighborhoods are defined via χ2 divergence, identify L and E with L2(F∗). Let ‖ · ‖2 denote
the L2(F∗) norm and observe that EF∗ [φ(mn)] = 12‖mn − 1‖22 and similarly for mn. We have
‖mn − 1‖22, ‖mn − 1‖22 ≤ 2δn ↓ 0 as n→∞. (31)
By similar arguments to the proof of Lemma 4.3, we may deduce EF∗ [h(U, θ∗)] = EF∗ [h(U, θ∗)] = 0.
It then follows by identifiability of θ(F∗) that θ∗ = θ
∗
= θ(F∗).
Note that mn and θn must satisfy EF∗ [mn(U)h(U, θn)] = 0. By differentiability of θ 7→ EF∗ [h(u, θ)]
at θ(F∗), we therefore obtain
−H(θn − θ(F∗)) + o(‖θn − θ(F∗)‖) = EF∗ [(mn(U)− 1)h(U, θn)] as θn → θ(F∗).
By Cauchy-Schwartz, Assumption M(i), and the fact that H has full rank, we therefore have
‖θn − θ(F∗)‖ = O(‖mn − 1‖2)
and hence, by (31), Cauchy-Schwarz, and L2(F∗) continuity of θ 7→ h(·, θ, γ0, P20) at θ(F∗), we
obtain
−H(θn − θ(F∗)) = EF∗ [(mn(U)− 1)h0(U)] + o(δ1/2n ) (32)
and so
θn − θ(F∗) = −(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1EF∗ [(mn(U)− 1)h0(U)] + o(δ1/2n ) .
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Turning to the counterfactual, by similar arguments we may deduce
EF∗ [mn(U)k(U, θn)]− κ(F∗) = J(θn − θ(F∗)) + EF∗ [(mn(U)− 1)(k0(U)− κ(F∗))] + o(δ1/2n )
= −J(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1EF∗ [(mn(U)− 1)h0(U)]
+ EF∗ [(mn(U)− 1)(k0(U)− κ(F∗))] + o(δ1/2n ) .
However, by (32) and definition of Π we also have
EF∗ [(mn(U)− 1)(k0(U)− κ(F∗)−Π(k0(U)− κ(F∗)))] = o(δ1/2n )
hence
EF∗ [mn(U)k(U, θn)]− κ(F∗) = EF∗ [(mn(U)− 1)ι(U)] + o(δ1/2n ) .
Analogous arguments apply to mn and θn. We have therefore shown
(EF∗ [mn(U)k(U, θn)−mn(U)k(U, θn)])2
4δn
=
(EF∗ [(mn(U)−mn(U))ι(U)])2
4δn
+ o(1) . (33)
It remains to control the denominator. To do so, first note that we must have mn 6= mn for all n
sufficiently large. Otherwise, substituting (33) into (30) yields o(1) ≥ 2EF∗ [ι(U)2] + ε. As n→∞,
the ε term dominates the o(1) term and we obtain a contradiction.
To complete the proof, observe that
‖mn −mn‖22 ≤ 2‖mn − 1‖22 + 2‖mn − 1‖22 ≤ 8δn (34)
by (31). Substituting (33) and (34) into (30) yields
2(EF∗ [(mn(U)−mn(U))ι(U)])2
‖mn −mn‖22
+ o(1) ≥ 2EF∗ [ι(U)2] + ε .
Finally, by Cauchy-Schwarz:
2EF∗ [ι(U)2] + o(1) ≥ 2EF∗ [ι(U)2] + ε .
As n→∞, the ε term dominates the o(1) term and we obtain a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 6.1. Immediate by consistency of (θˆ, γˆ, Pˆ ) and Slutsky’s theorem.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. The proof follows similar arguments to the proof of Theorem 6.1, here
we just note the necessary modifications. First note (again dropping dependence on γ to simplify
notation) that here κ(Ft) = k(θ(Ft)). In the proof of the inequality s ≥ 2EF∗ [ι(U)2], we modify the
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derivative of κ to obtain
dκ(Ft)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= −J(AH)−1AEF∗ [h0(U)Πb(U)]
= EF∗ [Πι˜(U)Πb(U)]
where ι˜(u) = −J(AH)−1Ah0(u). We may again verify that irrespective of the choice of A, we have
Πι˜ = −J(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1h0 hence
dκ(Ft)
dt
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= EF∗ [ι(U)Πb(U)]
for all b ∈ L2(F∗).
For the proof of the reverse inequality, inequality (30) is replaced with the inequality
(k(θn)− k(θn))2
4δn
≥ 2EF∗ [ι(U)2] + ε .
where we may deduce similarly that
k(θn)− κ(F∗) = −J(H ′V −1H)−1H ′V −1EF∗ [(mn(U)− 1)h0(U)] + o(δ1/2n )
= EF∗ [(mn(U)− 1)ι(U)] + o(δ1/2n ) .
Analogous arguments apply to mn and θn. In place of (33) we now have
(k(θn)− k(θn))2
4δn
=
(EF∗ [(mn(U)−mn(U))ι(U)])2
4δn
+ o(1) .
The remainder of the proof now follows similarly.
Proof of Lemma 6.2. Immediate by consistency of (θˆ, γˆ, Pˆ ) and Slutsky’s theorem.
Proof of Lemma B.1. Clearly κ(Nδ) ≥ inf K∞ for each δ > 0. Suppose inf K∞ is finite. Fix
any ε > 0. Then there is Fε ∈ N∞ and θε ∈ Θ such that (1)–(4) all hold at (θε, γ0, P0) under Fε
and EFε [k(U, θε, γ0)] < inf K∞ + ε. But then for any δ ≥ Dφ(Fε‖F0) we necessarily have κ(Nδ) <
inf K∞+ε. If inf K∞ = −∞, then for each n ∈ N there exists Fn ∈ N∞ and θn ∈ Θ such that (1)–(4)
all hold at (θn, γ0, P0) under Fn and EFn [k(U, θn, γ0)] < −n. But then for any δ ≥ Dφ(Fn‖F0) we
necessarily have κ(Nδ) < −n.
Proof of Lemma B.2. Let L+ denote the cone of (F∗-almost surely) non-negative functions in
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L. We may write κ∞(θ; γ, P ) as a conic program:
κ∞(θ; γ, P ) = inf
m∈L+
EF∗ [m(U)k(U, θ, γ)] subject to the constraints in (22).
By standard duality results for conic programs (Bonnans and Shapiro, 2000, Section 2.5.6), the
dual of κ∞(θ; γ, P ) is
κ?∞(θ; γ, P ) = sup
ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
−ζ − λ′12P subject to ζ + F∗-ess inf(k(·, θ, γ) + λ′g(·, θ, γ)) ≥ 0 .
Whenever F∗-ess inf(k(u, θ, γ)+λ′g(u, θ, γ)) > −∞ the solution for ζ must set ζ = −F∗-ess inf(k(·, θ, γ)+
λ′g(·, θ, γ)) in which case
κ?∞(θ; γ, P ) = sup
λ∈Λ
(
F∗-ess inf(k(·, θ, γ) + λ′g(·, θ, γ))− λ′12P
)
.
Conversely, if F∗-ess inf(k(·, θ, γ) + λ′g(·, θ, γ)) = −∞ then λ is clearly infeasible.
To establish strong duality, the constraint qualification we require is
(1, P ′, 0′)′ ∈ int({(EF∗ [m(U)(1, g(U, θ, γ)′)])′ : m ∈ L+}+ {0} × C) ,
which holds whenever Condition S holds at (θ, γ0, P0) (cf. Lemma D.2). It follows by Theorem 2.187
of Bonnans and Shapiro (2000) that strong duality holds.
Lemma B.3 is proved by applying some results of Csisza´r and Matu´sˇ (2012) that extend classical
duality results relying on paired function classes to much broader classes of functions. Their results
apply to optimization problems constrained by equality restrictions. Some (straightforward) modi-
fications are required to show similar characterizations apply to classes with inequality restrictions.
Proof of Lemma B.3. Fix any θ ∈ Θ. With θ fixed, we drop dependence of g and k on (θ, γ0, P0)
for the remainder of the proof. Let L1+(µ) denote the cone of µ-almost everywhere non-negative
functions in L1(µ). Let M˙ = {m ∈ L1(µ) : ∫ mg dµ is finite} and let M˙+ = M˙ ∩ L1+(µ). Thus,
F ∈ Fθ if and only if its derivative with respect to µ, say m, belongs to M˙+. Similarly, any m ∈M+
with
∫
m dµ = 1 corresponds to a distribution in Fθ. For any c ∈ Rd+1, define the set
M[c] =
{
m ∈ M˙+ :
∫
(1, g(u)′)′m(u) dµ(u) = (1, P ′0, 0
′
d3+d4)
′ + c
}
.
Also let the functions q1, q2 : Rd+1 → (−∞,+∞] be given by
q1(c) = inf
{∫
mk dµ : m ∈M[c]
}
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and
q2(c) =
[
0 if c ∈ {0} × Rd1− × {0}d2 × Rd3− × {0}d4 ,
+∞ otherwise.
The functions q1 and q2 are lower-semicontinuous, proper convex functions (Rockafellar, 1970,
p. 24). Note µ-essential boundedness of k guarantees that q1(c) > −∞ for all c. The quantity
κ#(θ; γ0, P0) may now be written in terms of q1 and q2:
κ#(θ; γ0, P0) = inf
c∈Rd+1
(q1(c) + q2(c))
If condition S# holds at (θ, γ0, P0) then ri({c : q1(c) < +∞}) and ri({c : q2(c) < +∞}) have
nonempty intersection. Fenchel’s duality theorem (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 31.3) then implies
κ#(θ; γ0, P0) = sup
ν∈Rd+1
(−q?1(ν)− q?2(−ν)) (35)
where q?1 and q
?
2 are the convex conjugates of q1 and q2. By direct calculation, we see that
− q?2(−ν) =
[
0 if ν ∈ R×−Λ ,
−∞ otherwise. (36)
For q?1, we begin by writing
−q?1(ν) = inf
c∈Rd+1
(−c′ν + q1(c))
= inf
c∈Rd+1
inf
m∈M[c]
(
−c′ν +
∫
mk dµ
)
= inf
c∈Rd+1
inf
m∈M[c]
(
(1, P ′0, 0
′
d3+d4)ν +
∫ (
k(u)− (1, g(u)′)ν)m(u) dµ(u))
= inf
m∈M˙+
(
(1, P ′0, 0
′
d3+d4)ν +
∫ (
k(u)− (1, g(u)′)ν)m(u) dµ(u)) .
Let
Q(u,m(u)) =
[
k(u)m(u) if m(u) ≥ 0 ,
+∞ otherwise.
We therefore have
−q?1(ν) = inf
m∈M˙
(
(1, P ′0, 0
′
d3+d4)ν +
∫ (
Q(u,m(u))− (1, g(u)′)ν)m(u) dµ(u)) .
By Remark A.3 and Theorem A.4 of Csisza´r and Matu´sˇ (2012), we may bring the infimum inside
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the expectation:
−q?1(ν) = (1, P ′0, 0′d3+d4)ν +
∫
inf
x∈R
(
Q(u, x)− (1, g(u)′)ν)x dµ(u)
= (1, P ′0, 0
′
d3+d4)ν +
∫
inf
x≥0
(
k(u)− (1, g(u)′)ν)x dµ(u)
=
[
−∞ if µ-ess inf(k(·)− (1, g(·)′)ν) < 0 ,
(1, P ′0, 0′d3+d4)ν otherwise.
(37)
Writing ν = (ζ, λ′)′, it now follows from (35), (36), and (37) that
κ#(θ; γ0, P0) = sup
ζ∈R,λ∈Λ:µ-ess inf(k(·)+g(·)′λ−ζ)≥0
ζ − λ′12P0
= sup
λ∈Λ:µ-ess inf(k(·)+g(·)′λ)>−∞
µ-ess inf(k(·) + g(·)′λ)− λ′12P0
as required.
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E Supplementary results
E.1 Notation
For x ∈ Rn and A ⊂ Rn let d(x,A) = infa∈A ‖x − a‖ where ‖ · ‖ denotes Euclidean norm. Let
~dH(A,B) = supa∈A infb∈B ‖a− b‖ denote the directed Hausdorff distance between sets A,B ⊂ Rn.
Let Bε denote a Euclidean ball centered at the origin with radius ε, where the dimension of the
ball should be obvious from the context. Let T ⊆ Rn be a nonempty, closed convex cone with
nonempty interior and let B ⊂ T . Let ∂B denote the boundary of B. We define the exterior
of B relative to T as ext(B;T ) = cl(∂B ∩ int(T )). For example, if n = 2, T = R × R+, and
B = {(x, y) : x2 + y2 ≤ 1, x ≥ 0}, then ext(B;T ) = {(x, y) : x2 + y2 = 1, x ≥ 0}.
E.2 Stability of constraint qualifications under perturbations
Lemma E.1 Let Assumption Φ hold and let Condition S hold at (θ, γ, P ). Then: there exists a
neighborhood N of P such that Condition S holds at (θ, γ, P˜ ) for each P˜ ∈ N .
Proof of Lemma E.1. First note B2ε ⊆ ({EF [g(U, θ, γ)] − (P ′, 0′d3+d4)′ : F ∈ N∞} + C) must
hold for some ε > 0. But for any P˜ with ‖P − P˜‖ < ε we clearly have
‖(EF [g(U, θ, γ)]− (P ′, 0′d3+d4)′)− (EF [g(U, θ, γ)]− (P˜ ′, 0′d3+d4)′)‖ < ε
for all F ∈ N∞, and so Bε ⊆ ({EF [g(U, θ, γ)]− (P˜ ′, 0′d3+d4)′ : F ∈ N∞}+ C).
Lemma E.2 Let Assumption Φ hold, let each entry of g be E-continuous in (θ, γ), and let Condition
S hold at (θ, γ, P ). Then: there exists a neighborhood N of (θ, γ, P ) such that Condition S holds at
(θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) for each (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N .
Proof of Lemma E.2. As Condition S holds at (θ, γ, P ), there exists sufficiently large δ such
that 0 ∈ int({EF [g(U, θ, γ)] − (P ′, 0′d3+d4)′ : F ∈ Nδ} + C). Therefore, we may choose ε > 0 such
that B4ε ⊆ int({EF [g(U, θ, γ)]− (P ′, 0′d3+d4)′ : F ∈ Nδ}+ C).
Identify any F ∈ Nδ with its Radon–Nikodym derivative with respect to F∗, say m ∈ Mδ. By
the proof of Lemma D.1, ‖m‖φ ≤ 2 + φ(2) + δ for each m ∈ Mδ. By E-continuity, there exists a
neighborhood N1 of (θ, γ) such that for any (θ˜, γ˜) ∈ N1 and with r denoting any entry of g1, g2,
64
g3, or g4, we have
‖r(·, θ, γ)− r(·, θ˜, γ˜)‖ψ < ε√
d(2 + φ(2) + δ)
.
It follows by Ho¨lder’s inequality for Orlicz classes that
sup
m∈Mδ
|EF∗ [m(U)r(U, θ, γ)]− EF∗ [m(U)r(U, θ˜, γ˜)]| ≤ ε√
d
for any (θ˜, γ˜) ∈ N1, hence Bε ⊆ ({EF [g(U, θ˜, γ˜)]− (P ′, 0′d3+d4)′ : F ∈ Nδ}+ C) for any (θ˜, γ˜) ∈ N1.
Now let N2 be an ε-neighborhood of P . For any F ∈ Nδ and any (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N1 ×N2, we have
‖(EF [m(U)g(U, θ, γ)]− (P ′, 0′)′)− (EF [m(U)g(U, θ˜, γ˜)]− (P˜ ′, 0′)′)‖ < 2ε
hence B2ε ⊆ int({EF [g(U, θ˜, γ˜)]− (P˜ ′, 0′d3+d4)′ : F ∈ Nδ}+ C).
Lemma E.3 Let Assumption Φ hold, let EF∗ [φ?(c1 +c′2g(U, θ, γ))] be continuous in (θ, γ) for every
(c1, c
′
2)
′ ∈ Rd+1, and let Condition S hold at (θ, γ, P ). Then: δ?(θ; γ, P ) is continuous at (θ, γ, P ).
Proof of Lemma E.3. Recall the definition of the program I(θ; γ, P ) (see the discussion imme-
diately preceding Lemma D.2). As Conditions S holds at (θ, γ, P ), we must have I(θ; γ, P ) < ∞.
The objective function
`(ζ, λ) = −EF∗ [φ?(ζ + λ′g(U, θ, γ))]− ζ − (λ′1, λ′2)′P
is the pointwise infimum of affine functions and is therefore concave and upper semicontinuous. By
Lemma D.2 and Theorem 2.165 of Bonnans and Shapiro (2000), the set of multipliers (ζ, λ) solving
the dual problem, say Ξ, is a nonempty, convex, and compact subset of R1+d. Fix ε > 0 and let
Ξε = {(ζ, λ) ∈ R× Λ : d((ζ, λ),Ξ) ≤ ε}. For any (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ Θ× Γ× P, let
˜`(ζ, λ) = −EF∗ [φ?(ζ + λ′g(U, θ˜, γ˜))]− ζ − (λ′1, λ′2)′P˜ .
By continuity of (θ, γ) 7→ EF∗ [φ?(c1 + c′2g(U, θ, γ))], ˜` converges pointwise to ` as (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) →
(θ, γ, P ). By concavity, convergence holds uniformly over Ξε (Rockafellar, 1970, Theorem 10.8), so
sup
(ζ,λ)∈Ξε
˜`(ζ, λ)→ δ?(θ; γ, P ) as (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ )→ (θ, γ, P ). (38)
By upper semicontinuity of ` and definition of Ξ:
δ?(θ; γ, P )− sup
(ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;R×Λ)
`(ζ, λ) =: 2a > 0 . (39)
It follows by (38) and (39) that there exists a neighborhood N of (θ, γ, P ) such that for any
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(θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N , the inequality
sup
(ζ,λ)∈Ξε
˜`(ζ, λ)− sup
(ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;R×Λ)
˜`(ζ, λ) > a
holds, hence arg sup(ζ,λ)∈Ξε ˜`(ζ, λ) ∩ ext(∂Ξε;R × Λ) = ∅. Take any (ζ, λ) ∈ R × Λ outside Ξε.
Then there exists (ζε, λε) ∈ ext(∂Ξε;R × Λ) that is the convex combination of (ζ, λ) and some
(ζ˜, λ˜) ∈ arg sup(ζ,λ)∈Ξε ˜`(ζ, λ). But then by concavity of ˜`:
˜`(ζ˜, λ˜) > ˜`(ζε, λε) ≥ τ ˜`(ζ˜, λ˜) + (1− τ)˜`(ζ, λ)
for some τ ∈ (0, 1). It follows that ˜`(ζ, λ) < sup(ζ,λ)∈Ξε ˜`(ζ, λ) must hold whenever (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N .
Therefore, whenever (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N we have δ?(θ˜; γ˜, P˜ ) = sup(ζ,λ)∈Ξε ˜`(ζ, λ). The result now follows
by display (38).
E.3 Continuity of extreme counterfactuals
The smallest and largest counterfactuals κ(Nδ) and κ¯(Nδ) depend implicitly on (γ, P ). In what
follows, we sometimes make this dependence explicit by writing κ(Nδ; γ, P ) and κ¯(Nδ; γ, P ). The
next two lemmas establish continuity of the extreme counterfactuals in (γ, P ). The results are
proved for κ; the proofs for κ¯ are identical. We first present results for the explicit-dependence case.
Lemma E.4 Let Assumptions Φ and M hold and let k depend on u. Then: κ(Nδ; ·, ·) and κ¯(Nδ; ·, ·)
are continuous on a neighborhood of (γ0, P0).
Proof of Lemma E.4. We first show κ(Nδ; ·, ·) is upper semicontinuous at (γ0, P0). Fix ε > 0.
By Lemma 4.3, choose θε ∈ Θδ such that κ?δ(θε; γ0, P0) < κ(Nδ; γ0, P0) + ε. As Condition S holds
at (θε, γ0, P0) (cf. Assumption M(ii)), Lemma E.2 implies that Condition S also holds at (θε, γ, P )
for all (γ, P ) in some neighborhood N of (γ0, P0). By continuity of δ
?(θε; ·, ·) at (γ0, P0) (cf. Lemma
E.3), the inequality δ?(θε, ·, ·) < δ holds on a neighborhood N ′ of (γ0, P0). It follows by Lemma 4.2
that κδ(θε; ·, ·) = κ?δ(θε; ·, ·) holds on N ∩N ′. Lemma E.7 implies that κ?δ(θε; ·, ·)) < κ?δ(θε; γ0, P0)+ε
holds on a neighborhood N ′′ of (γ0, P0). On N ∩N ′ ∩N ′′ we therefore have
κ(Nδ; ·, ·) ≤ κδ(θε; ·, ·) = κ?δ(θε; ·, ·) < κ?δ(θε; γ0, P0) + ε < κ(Nδ; γ0, P0) + 2ε .
We establish lower semicontinuity by contradiction. Suppose there is ε > 0 and a sequence (γn, Pn)→
(γ0, P0) along which
κ(Nδ; γn, Pn) ≤ κ(Nδ; γ0, P0)− ε . (40)
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For each n, choose θn ∈ Θ and Fn ∈ Nδ for which EFn [k(U, θn, γn)] < κδ(γn, Pn) + ε. Let mn
denote the derivative of Fn with respect to F∗. By Assumption M(iv), we may assume (taking
a subsequence if necessary) that θn → θ∗ for some θ∗ ∈ Θ. By E-weak convergence, there is a
subsequence {ni : i ≥ 1} along which mni is E-weakly convergent to a unique m∗ ∈ L+. By similar
arguments to the proof of Lemma 4.3, we may use E-weak convergence and Assumption M(i) to
deduce that m∗ ∈Mδ, m∗ satisfies the constraints in (22) at (θ∗, γ0, P0), and
EF∗ [mni(U)k(U, θni , γni)]→ EF∗ [m∗(U)k(U, θ∗, γ0)] .
But by (40) this implies EF∗ [m∗(U)k(U, θ∗, γ0)] ≤ κ(Nδ; γ, P )− ε, which contradicts the definition
of κ(Nδ; γ0, P0).
Lemma E.5 Let Assumptions Φ and M hold with k depending only on (θ, γ). Then: κ(Nδ; ·, ·) and
κ¯(Nδ; ·, ·) are continuous on a neighborhood of (γ0, P0).
Proof of Lemma E.5. The proof follows similar arguments to Lemma E.5. For upper semiconti-
nuity, for any ε > 0 we may choose θε ∈ Θδ such that k(θε, γ0) < κ(Nδ; γ0, P0) + ε. It follows from
Lemmas E.2 and E.3 that there is a neighborhood N of (γ, P ) such that (i) Condition S holds at
(θε, γ, P ) and (ii) δ
?(θε; γ, P ) < δ for all (γ, P ) ∈ N . By continuity of k(θε, ·) there also exists a
neighborhood N ′ of γ0 on which k(θε, ·) < k(θε, γ0) + ε Therefore on N ∩ (N ′ × Rd1+d2) we have
κ(Nδ; ·, ·) ≤ k(θε, ·) < k(θε, γ0) + ε < κ(Nδ; γ0, P0) + 2ε ,
establishing upper semicontinuity. The proof of lower semicontinuity follows similar arguments to
the proof of Lemma E.4.
E.4 Convergence of multipliers
This section contains some ancillary results on the convergence of multipliers. As before, we prove
the results only for the lower bound; corresponding results for the upper bound follow by parallel
arguments.
In the explicit-dependence case, let Ξδ(θ; γ, P ) denote the set of Lagrange multipliers (η, ζ, λ
′)′
solving κ?δ(θ; γ, P ) in equation (5). In the implicit-dependence case, we may simultaneously check
feasibility of (θ, γ, P ) and evaluate the counterfactual using the convex program
κδ(θ; γ, P ) = inf
F∈Nδ
k(θ, γ) subject to (1)–(4) holding under F at (θ, γ, P ) . (41)
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The value of this program is k(θ, γ) if there is a distribution F ∈ Nδ satisfying the constraints at
(θ, γ, P ), otherwise the value of the program is +∞. By analogous arguments to Lemma 4.1, the
program (41) has the dual representation
κ?δ(θ; γ, P ) = k(θ, γ) + sup
η≥0,ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
−EF∗
[
(ηφ)?(−ζ − λ′g(U, θ, γ))
]
− ηδ − ζ − λ′12P . (42)
Similarly, define
κ¯δ(θ; γ, P ) = sup
F∈Nδ
k(θ, γ) subject to (1)–(4) holding under F at (θ, γ, P )
which takes the value k(θ, γ) if if there is a distribution F ∈ Nδ satisfying the constraints at (θ, γ, P )
and −∞ otherwise. This program has the dual representation
κ¯?δ(θ; γ, P ) = k(θ, γ) + inf
η≥0,ζ∈R,λ∈Λ
EF∗
[
(ηφ)?(−ζ − λ′g(U, θ, γ))
]
+ ηδ + ζ + λ′12P . (43)
Thus, in the implicit-dependence case, we let Ξδ(θ; γ, P ) and Ξδ(θ; γ, P ) denote the sets of multi-
pliers solving (42) and (43), respectively.
Lemma E.6 Let Assumption Φ hold, let Condition S hold at (θ, γ, P ), and let δ?(θ; γ, P ) < δ.
Then: Ξδ(θ; γ, P ) is a nonempty, compact, convex subset of R+ × R× Λ.
Proof of Lemma E.6. Follows from Theorem 2.165 of Bonnans and Shapiro (2000): the objective
is the pointwise infimum of affine functions and is therefore concave and upper semicontinuous, and
condition S implies a Slater constraint qualification (cf. Lemma D.2).
The next lemma uses some insights from Pollard (1991). Let T = R+×R×Λ. For each ε > 0 we may
cover Ξδ(θ; γ, P ) ⊂ T by a set Ξδ(θ; γ, P )ε ⊂ T consisting of finitely many hypercubes with edges
parallel to the coordinate axes so that d((η, ζ, λ),Ξδ(θ; γ, P )) ≤ ε for all (η, ζ, λ) ∈ Ξδ(θ; γ, P )ε and
so that ext(∂Ξδ(θ; γ, P )
ε;T ) ∩ Ξδ(θ; γ, P ) = ∅.
Lemma E.7 Let Assumptions Φ and M(i)(v) hold, let Condition S hold at (θ, γ, P ), and let
δ?(θ; γ, P ) < δ. Then: for each ε > 0 there exists a neighborhood N of (θ, γ, P ) such that for each
(θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N the multipliers Ξδ(θ˜; γ˜, P˜ ) solving κ?δ(θ˜; γ˜, P˜ ) are contained in Ξδ(θ; γ, P )ε. Moreover,
κ?δ is continuous at (θ, γ, P ).
Proof of Lemma E.7. We prove the result for the explicit-dependence case. The result for the
implicit-dependence case follows similarly.
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Step 1 (preliminaries): To simplify notation, let Ξ = Ξδ(θ; γ, P ) and Ξ
ε = Ξδ(θ; γ, P )
ε. Lemmas
E.2 and E.3 imply there is a neighborhood N ′ of (θ, γ, P ) such that (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) is attainable and
δ?(θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) < δ for each (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N ′. By Lemma E.6, for each (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N ′ the multipliers
Ξ˜ := Ξδ(θ˜; γ˜, P˜ ) solving κ
?
δ(θ˜; γ˜, P˜ ) are a nonempty, compact, convex subset of T . Let
`(η, ζ, λ) = inf
m∈L+
L(m, η, ζ, λ; θ, γ, P ) , ˜`(η, ζ, λ) = inf
m∈L+
L(m, η, ζ, λ; θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) .
By upper semicontinuity of ` and definition of Ξ, we have
κ?δ(θ; γ, P )− sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T )
`(η, ζ, λ) =: 4a > 0 . (44)
The remaining steps of the proof depend on whether inf{η : (η, ζ, λ) ∈ Ξ} > 0 or not.
Step 2 (proof when inf{η : (η, ζ, λ′)′ ∈ Ξ} > 0): Without loss of generality we may choose Ξε such
that inf{η : (η, ζ, λ) ∈ Ξε} > 0. As
`(η, ζ, λ) = −EF∗
[
(ηφ)?(−k(U, θ, γ)− λ′g(U, θ, γ)− ζ)
]
− ηδ − ζ − λ′12P
when η > 0, it follows by Assumption M(v) that ˜`(η, ζ, λ)→ `(η, ζ, λ) as (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ )→ (θ, γ, P ). This
convergence is pointwise for (η, ζ, λ) ∈ R+×Rd+1 with η > 0. By concavity of ˜`(·, ·, ·) and Theorem
10.8 of Rockafellar (1970), pointwise convergence may be strengthened to uniform convergence on
compact subsets of R++ × Rd+1, hence
sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈Ξε
˜`(η, ζ, λ)→ κ?δ(θ; γ, P ) as (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ )→ (θ, γ, P ). (45)
By (44) and (45), there exists a neighborhood N ′′ of (θ, γ, P ) such that for (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N ′ ∩N ′′, the
inequality
sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈Ξε
˜`(η, ζ, λ)− sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T )
˜`(η, ζ, λ) > 2a
holds. It follows that arg sup(η,ζ,λ)∈Ξε ˜`(η, ζ, λ)∩ext(∂Ξε;T ) = ∅ holds onN ′∩N ′′. Fix any (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈
N ′ ∩N ′′. Take any point (η, ζ, λ) ∈ T \Ξε. Then there is a point (ηε, ζε, λε) ∈ ext(∂Ξε;T ) that is a
convex combination of (η, ζ, λ) and a point (η˜, ζ˜, λ˜) ∈ arg sup(η,ζ,λ)∈Ξε ˜`(η, ζ, λ). But then we have
˜`(η˜, ζ˜, λ˜) > ˜`(ηε, ζε, λε) ≥ τ ˜`(η˜, ζ˜, λ˜) + (1− τ)˜`(η, ζ, λ)
for some τ ∈ (0, 1), hence ˜`(η, ζ, λ) < sup(η,ζ,λ)∈Ξε ˜`(η, ζ, λ). Therefore, Ξ˜ ⊆ Ξε must hold on
N ′ ∩N ′′. Continuity now follows by (45).
Step 3 (proof when inf{η : (η, ζ, λ′)′ ∈ Ξ} = 0): We break this proof into several steps.
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Step 3a (proof that Ξ˜ ⊆ Ξε on a neighborhood of (θ, γ, P )): As inf{η : (η, ζ, λ) ∈ Ξ} = 0 and
Ξ is compact, there exists (ζ¯, λ¯) ∈ R × Λ such that (0, ζ¯, λ¯) ∈ Ξ. By upper semicontinuity and
concavity of `, we may deduce that limη↓0 `(η, ζ¯, λ¯) = `(0, ζ¯, λ¯) (cf. the proof of Lemma 4.1). So for
any ε0 ∈ (0, a) we may choose η¯ > 0 such that `(η¯, ζ¯, λ¯) > `(0, ζ¯, λ¯)− ε0 and (η¯, ζ¯, λ¯) ∈ int(Ξε). By
Assumption M(v), there exists a neighborhood N ′′ of (θ, γ, P ) upon which the inequality
˜`(η¯, ζ¯, λ¯) > κ?δ(θ; γ, P )− 2ε0 (46)
holds for all (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N ′′.
We now show by contradiction that the inequality
sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T )
`(η, ζ, λ) ≥ sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T )
˜`(η, ζ, λ)− 2ε0 (47)
holds on a neighborhood N ′′′ of (θ, γ, P ). To establish a contradiction, suppose that there is ε1 > 0
and a sequence {(θn, γn, Pn) : n ≥ 1} converging to (θ, γ, P ) along which
sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T )
`(η, ζ, λ) ≤ sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T )
`n(η, ζ, λ)− ε1 , (48)
where `n(η, ζ, λ) := infm∈L+ L(m, η, ζ, λ; θn, γn, Pn). For each n ≥ 1, choose
(ηn, ζn, λn) ∈ arg sup(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T )`n(η, ζ, λ) .
As ext(∂Ξε;T ) is compact, we may take a subsequence {(ηni , ζni , λni) : i ≥ 1} converging to some
point (η∗, ζ∗, λ∗) ∈ ext(∂Ξε;T ). There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: if η∗ > 0, then by uniform convergence of `n to ` on compact subsets of R++ × Rd+1 we
obtain
lim
i→∞
`ni(ηni , ζni , λni) = `(η
∗, ζ∗, λ∗) ≤ sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T )
`(η, ζ, λ) ,
contradicting (48).
Case 2: If η∗ = 0, fix any small ε2 > 0 so that (ε2, ζ∗, λ∗) ∈ Ξε. By upper semicontinuity and
concavity of `(·, ζ∗, λ∗), we may choose ε2 sufficiently small that `(ε2, ζ∗, λ∗) − `(2ε2, ζ∗, λ∗) < ε1.
For all i large enough we have ηni < ε2 and hence τni :=
ε2
2ε2−ηni ∈ (0, 1). By concavity:
`ni(ηni , ζni , λni) ≤
1
τni
(`ni(ε2, ζni , λni)− (1− τni)`ni(2ε2, ζni , λni)) .
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But by uniform convergence of `ni on compact subsets of R++ × Rd+1, we therefore have
lim
i→∞
`ni(ηni , ζni , λni) ≤ 2`(ε2, ζ∗, λ∗)− `(2ε2, ζ∗, λ∗)
≤ sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T )
`(η, ζ, λ) + (`(ε2, ζ
∗, λ∗)− `(2ε2, ζ∗, λ∗))
< sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T )
`(η, ζ, λ) + ε1 ,
contradicting (48). This proves inequality (47).
It now follows from displays (44), (46), and (47) that on N ′ ∩N ′′ ∩N ′′′ we have
˜`(η¯, ζ¯, λ¯) > κ?δ(θ; γ, P )− 2ε0 = sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T )
`(η, ζ, λ) + 4a− 2ε0
≥ sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T )
˜`(η, ζ, λ) + 4(a− ε0) ,
where a − ε0 > 0. Therefore, sup(η,ζ,λ)∈Ξε ˜`(η, ζ, λ) > sup(η,ζ,λ)∈ext(∂Ξε;T ) ˜`(η, ζ, λ) holds on N ′ ∩
N ′′ ∩N ′′′. It now follows by similar arguments to Step 2 that Ξ˜ ⊆ Ξε on N ′ ∩N ′′ ∩N ′′′.
Step 3b (proof of continuity): By Step 3a, for any (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N ′ ∩N ′′ ∩N ′′′ we have
κ?δ(θ˜; γ˜, P˜ ) = sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈R+×R×Λ
˜`(η, ζ, λ) = sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈Ξε
˜`(η, ζ, λ) . (49)
It follows by (46) that
κ?δ(θ˜; γ˜, P˜ ) ≥ ˜`(η¯, ζ¯, λ¯) > κ?δ(θ; γ, P )− 2ε0 ,
proving lower semicontinuity. To establish upper semicontinuity, for each ε0 > 0 one may deduce
(by similar arguments used to establish inequality (47) in Step 3a) there is a neighborhood N ′′′′ of
(θ, γ, P ) upon which
sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈Ξε
`(η, ζ, λ) ≥ sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈Ξε
˜`(η, ζ, λ)− ε0 (50)
holds. It follows by (49) and (50) that on N ′ ∩N ′′ ∩N ′′′ ∩N ′′′′, we have
κ?δ(θ˜; γ˜, P˜ ) = sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈Ξ
˜`(η, ζ, λ) ≤ sup
(η,ζ,λ)∈Ξ
`(η, ζ, λ) + ε0 = κ
?
δ(θ; γ, P ) + ε0
as required.
Lemma E.8 Let Assumptions Φ and M(i)(v) hold, let Condition S hold at (θ, γ, P ), and let
δ?(θ; γ, P ) < δ. Then:
~dH(Ξδ(θ˜; γ˜, P˜ ),Ξδ(θ; γ, P ))→ 0 , ~dH(Ξδ(θ˜; γ˜, P˜ ),Ξδ(θ; γ, P ))→ 0 as (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ )→ (θ, γ, P ).
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Proof of Lemma E.8. Fix ε > 0. By Lemma E.7, there is a neighborhood N of (θ, γ, P ) such
that Ξδ(θ˜; γ˜, P˜ ) ⊆ Ξδ(θ; γ, P )ε holds for all (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N . Therefore, the inequality
~dH(Ξδ(θ˜; γ˜, P˜ ),Ξδ(θ; γ, P )) ≤ ~dH(Ξδ(θ; γ, P )ε,Ξδ(θ; γ, P )) ≤ ε
holds for all (θ˜, γ˜, P˜ ) ∈ N .
E.5 Feasibility
Consider characterizing the extreme counterfactuals in the implicit-dependence case. We may use
conic programs to check whether there exists a distribution that satisfies the moment conditions
(1)–(4) at a particular point θ. If so, we say that θ is feasible.
To check feasibility of θ for distributions belonging to N∞, we may use the program
f∞(θ; γ, P ) = inf
F∈N∞
0 subject to (1)–(4) holding at (θ, F )
where f∞(θ; γ, P ) = +∞ if infimum runs over an empty set.
Lemma E.9 Let Assumption Φ hold. Then: the dual of f∞(θ; γ, P ) is:
f?∞(θ; γ, P ) = sup
λ∈Λ:F∗-ess inf(λ′g(·,θ,γ))>−∞
(
F∗-ess inf(λ′g(·, θ, γ))− λ′12P
)
.
If condition S also holds at (θ, γ, P ), then: strong duality holds: f∞(θ; γ, P ) = f?∞(θ; γ, P ).
Proof of Lemma E.9. Recall L+ is the cone of (F∗-almost surely) non-negative functions in L.
We may write f∞(θ; γ, P ) as a conic program:
f∞(θ; γ, P ) = inf
m∈L+
0 subject to the constraints in (22).
The result follows by similar arguments to the proof of Lemma B.2.
To check feasibility of θ for distributions belonging to Fθ, we may use the program
f#(θ; γ, P ) = inf
F∈Fθ
0 subject to (1)–(4) holding at (θ, F )
where f#(θ; γ, P ) = +∞ if infimum runs over an empty set.
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Lemma E.10 Let Condition S# hold at (θ, γ0, P0). Then: the dual of f#(θ; γ0, P0) is:
f?#(θ; γ0, P0) = sup
λ∈Λ:µ-ess inf(λ′g(·,θ,γ0))>−∞
(
µ-ess inf(λ′g(·, θ, γ0))− λ′12P0
)
and strong duality holds: f#(θ; γ0, P0) = f
?
#(θ; γ0, P0).
Proof of Lemma E.10. We use similar arguments to the proof of Lemma B.3, stating only the
necessary modifications here. Let M˙ = {m ∈ L1(µ) : ∫ mg dµ is finite} and let M˙+ = M˙ ∩L1+(µ).
For any c ∈ Rd+1, define
M[c] =
{
m ∈ M˙+ :
∫
(1, g(u)′)′m(u) dµ(u) = (1, P ′0, 0
′
d3+d4)
′ + c
}
Also let the functions q1, q2 : Rd+1 → (−∞,+∞] be given by
q1(c) =
[
0 if M[c] 6= ∅ ,
+∞ otherwise
and
q2(c) =
[
0 if c ∈ {0} × Rd1− × {0}d2 × Rd3− × {0}d4 ,
+∞ otherwise
in which case
f#(θ; γ0, P0) = inf
c∈Rd+1
(q1(c) + q2(c))
If condition S# holds at (θ, γ0, P0) then ri({c : q1(c) < +∞}) and ri({c : q2(c) < +∞}) have
nonempty intersection. By Fenchel’s duality theorem, we therefore obtain
f#(θ; γ0, P0) = sup
ν∈Rd+1
(−q?1(ν)− q?2(−ν)) (51)
where q?1 and q
?
2 are the convex conjugates of q1 and q2; see display (36) for q
?
2. For q
?
1, we have
−q?1(ν) = inf
c∈Rd+1
(−c′ν + q1(c))
= inf
c∈Rd+1:M[c] 6=∅
(−c′ν)
= inf
c∈Rd+1:M[c] 6=∅
inf
m∈M[c]
(
(1, P ′0, 0
′
d3+d4)ν −
∫
(1, g(u)′)νm(u) dµ(u)
)
= inf
m∈M˙+
(
(1, P ′0, 0
′
d3+d4)ν −
∫
(1, g(u)′)νm(u) dµ(u)
)
.
Let
Q(m(u)) =
[
0 if m(u) ≥ 0 ,
+∞ otherwise.
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Therefore:
−q?1(ν) = inf
m∈M˙
(
(1, P ′0, 0
′
d3+d4)ν +
∫ (
Q(m(u))− (1, g(u)′)ν)m(u) dµ(u)) .
By Remark A.3 and Theorem A.4 of Csisza´r and Matu´sˇ (2012), we may bring the infimum inside
the expectation:
−q?1(ν) = (1, P ′0, 0′d3+d4)ν +
∫
inf
x∈R
(
Q(x)− (1, g(u)′)ν)x dµ(u)
= (1, P ′0, 0
′
d3+d4)ν +
∫
inf
x≥0
(−(1, g(u)′)ν)x dµ(u)
=
[
−∞ if µ-ess inf(−(1, g(·)′)ν) < 0
(1, P ′0, 0′d3+d4)ν otherwise.
(52)
Writing ν = (ζ, λ′)′, it follows from (36), (51), and (52) that
q = sup
ζ∈R,λ∈Λ:µ-ess inf(g(·)′λ−ζ)≥0
ζ − λ′12P0
= sup
λ∈Λ:µ-ess inf(g(·)′λ)>−∞
µ-ess inf(g(·)′λ)− λ′12P0
as required.
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